Articles
Consumer Casualties: Political Boycotts and International Disputes
Journal of East Asian Studies, 2023, 23, 387–410 (with Panle Jia Barwick, Shanjun Li, and Jeremy Wallace)
We explore whether international disputes harm commerce by galvanizing consumer boycotts of foreign products. Boycotts increase the social penalty of owning goods associated with a foreign adversary, offsetting individual incentives to free ride or discount the utility of participation. By harming international commerce, boycotts reveal information about resolve and help avoid more costly forms of conflict. We demonstrate that the consumer boycott that arose amid tensions between China and Japan over a territorial dispute in 2012 had significant and persistent effects, especially in cities that witnessed anti-Japanese street demonstrations. Using administrative data on every car registration in China from 2009 to 2015, we find that the market share of Japanese automobile brands dropped substantially while Chinese and American brands benefited, with effects lasting several years. Our analysis provides concrete evidence of the short- and long-term impact of international tensions on economic activities.
Provocation, Public Opinion, and International Disputes: Evidence from China
International Studies Quarterly, 2022 (with Allan Dafoe, Samuel Liu, and Brian O'Keefe)
What public pressures do leaders face in international disputes? Leaders often denounce foreign actions as provocations, triggering public anger and demands for restitution. Rather than generating a reflexive rally around the flag, we argue that leaders who invoke foreign provocations—whether hypothetical, remembered, exaggerated, or real—face heightened public disapproval if they fail to take tough action in the present. Across two survey experiments and a quasi-natural experiment involving US naval patrols in the South China Sea, we find that incidents construed as provocative increase public pressure on the Chinese government to respond or incur public disapproval. We discuss possible explanations, how government elites seek to mitigate public disapproval, and how such events can change the logic of coercion and deterrence.
Strong State or Vulnerable Homeland: How Chinese State Media Sought to Combat Democratic Diffusion During the 2019 Hong Kong Protests, Journal of Contemporary China, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2022.2052442 (with Shiqi Ma)
Departing from its typical silence on pro-democracy movements around the world, Chinese state media encouraged a flood of reports about the 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Movement in Hong Kong . This article investigates two different media framing strategies to prevent democratic diffusion: demobilizing the masses by emphasizing state capacity and repression, and rallying the masses by emphasizing threats to national unity. Analyzing an original dataset of articles about the Hong Kong protests in the People’s Daily, this article documents a greater overall reliance on the rallying strategy, a tendency that became particularly pronounced in the later stage of the protest movement. Chinese media selectively reported events that would emphasize threats and downplayed stories about repression.
Domestic Politics, China’s Rise, and the Future of the Liberal International Order
International Organization, 2021, 1-30, doi:10.1017/S002081832000048X. (with Jeremy Wallace) (PDF)
With the future of liberal internationalism in question, how will China’s growing power and influence reshape world politics? We argue that views of the liberal international order (LIO) as integrative and resilient have been too optimistic, for two reasons. First, China’s ability to profit from within the system has shaken the domestic consensus within the United States for preserving the LIO. Second, features of Chinese Communist Party rule chafe against many of the fundamental principles of the LIO but could coexist with a return to Westphalian principles and markets that are embedded in domestic systems of control. How, then, do authoritarian states like China pick and choose how to engage with key institutions and norms within the LIO? We propose a framework that highlights two domestic variables—centrality and heterogeneity—and their implications for China's international behavior. We illustrate the framework with examples from China’s approach to climate change, trade and exchange rates, internet governance, territorial sovereignty, arms control, and humanitarian intervention. Finally, we conclude by considering what alternative versions of international order might emerge as China’s influence grows.
“Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in the Routledge Handbook on Ideology in International Relations, ed. Mark L. Haas and Jonathan Leader Maynard, 2022. (with Eun A Jo*)
An Ideological Contest in U.S.-China Relations? Assessing China’s Defense of Autocracy
in After Engagement: Dilemmas in U.S.-China Security Relations, eds. Avery Goldstein and Jacques deLisle.
China’s renewed authoritarianism and growing international influence have paralleled democratic erosion in new and established democracies alike. These twin developments have added an ideological valence to growing security and trade tensions in U.S.-China relations. Although there is scant evidence that the Chinese Communist Party is deliberately trying to spread autocracy or defeat democracy, China’s success and influence have made the world safer for autocracy. The essay concludes by considering how U.S. actions might affect Beijing’s calculus and the future of competition between autocracy and democracy.
Getting Tough on China: Are Campaign Ads A Signal of Future Policy or Just Cheap Talk?
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12307 (with Amber Wichowsky) Ungated version
Is tough-on-China campaign rhetoric cheap talk or a signal of policy attention? Analyzing China-related campaign advertisements during the 2010 midterm elections and subsequent cosponsorship of China-related bills, we find that campaign ads are a noisy predictor of legislative attention. Challengers who attacked on China were more likely to cosponsor China-related legislation, while incumbents who were attacked for being soft on China took tougher positions on China after reelection. By demonstrating the correspondence between anti-China campaign appeals and subsequent legislative attention, our findings add to a growing body of evidence linking campaign rhetoric to members’ legislative agendas. This research note provides the first evidence demonstrating the connection between campaign appeals and legislative attention on a foreign policy issue like China.
Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China
International Studies Quarterly, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz059 (with Allan Dafoe). Ungated version. appendix
How do government rhetoric and propaganda affect mass reactions in international crises? Using two scenario-based survey experiments in China, one hypothetical and one that selectively reminds respondents of recent events, we assess how government statements and propaganda affect Chinese citizens' approval of their government's performance in its territorial and maritime disputes. We find evidence that citizens disapprove more of inaction after explicit threats to use force, suggesting that leaders can face public opinion costs akin to audience costs in an authoritarian setting. However, we also find evidence that citizens approve of bluster--vague and ultimately empty threats--suggesting that talking tough can provide benefits, even in the absence of tough action. In addition, narratives that invoke future success to justify present restraint increase approval, along with frames that emphasize a shared history of injustice at the hands of foreign powers.
Campaign Rhetoric and Chinese Reactions to New Leaders
Asian Security, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1651717 (with Kacie Miura). Ungated version.
Although China tends to be an important topic in election campaigns, the consequences of this rhetoric have not been systematically examined. We highlight the process by which China uses campaign rhetoric to make inferences about the intentions of new leaders in the US, Taiwan, and Japan. We identify two key criteria – consistency and change – that guide Chinese assessments. In turn, three patterns define Chinese policy toward new administrations: proactive engagement when campaign rhetoric is consistent with other indicators of policy change; reactive engagement when rhetoric is consistent with continuity; and a wait and see approach when rhetoric is inconsistent with the candidate’s past actions and the reputation of close advisors. Our findings push back against arguments linking leadership transitions to international conflict. Rather than testing the resolve of new leaders with military probes, foreign states can use information overheard during elections to gauge their counterparts’ intentions and ensure stability immediately after elections.
How hawkish is the Chinese public? Another look at “rising nationalism” and Chinese foreign policy
Journal of Contemporary China, 2019, 28: 119, 679-695. Ungated version.
Chinese leaders often invoke the feelings of the Chinese people in denouncing foreign actions in international confrontations. But most survey research on Chinese public opinion on international affairs has looked at measures of nationalist identity rather than beliefs about foreign policy and evaluations of the government’s performance. Five surveys of Chinese citizens, netizens, and elites help illuminate the public attitudes that the Chinese government grapples with in managing international security policy. The results show that Chinese attitudes are more hawkish than dovish and that younger Chinese, while perhaps not more nationalist in identity, may be more hawkish in their foreign policy beliefs than older generations. Netizens and elites are even more inclined to call on the Chinese government to invest and rely more on military strength.
External Influence on Exchange Rates: An Empirical Investigation of US Pressure and the Chinese RMB
Review of International Political Economy, 25:5, 596-623, December 2018 (with Amber Wichowsky). Ungated version.
Trade imbalances have often led to accusations of “currency manipulation” and efforts to remedy the purported effects of exchange rate misalignment. This paper investigates the impact of US pressure on China to revalue the RMB. Using vector autoregression (VAR) to analyze an original dataset of US statements and actions between 2005 and 2012, we examine the over-time dynamics between US pressure and the nominal RMB/USD exchange rate. A case study of mounting US pressure in advance of the 2010 midterm election illustrates China’s responsiveness in timing adjustments in the RMB to defuse the risk of an international confrontation. Our findings indicate that external political pressures can influence national exchange rate policies under certain conditions.
The Political and Economic Consequences of Nationalist Protest in China: The 2012 Anti-Japanese Demonstrations
China Quarterly, Volume 236, December 2018, 1131-1153 (with Kevin Foley and Jeremy Wallace). Ungated version.
What are the consequences of nationalist unrest? This paper utilizes original datasets of 377 city-level anti-Japanese protests during the 2012 Senkaku/Diaoyu Island crisis and of the careers of municipal leaders to analyze the downstream effects of nationalist unrest at the subnational level. We find both political and economic consequences of China’s 2012 protest demonstrations against Japan. Specifically, top party leaders in cities that saw relatively spontaneous, early protests were less likely to be promoted to higher office, consistent with the widely-held but rarely tested expectation that social instability is punished in the Chinese Communist Party’s cadre evaluation system. We also find a negative effect of nationalist protest on FDI growth at the city level. However, the lower promotion rates associated with relatively spontaneous protests seem to have arisen through political rather than economic channels. By taking into account data on social unrest in addition to economic performance, these results add to existing evidence that systematic evaluation of leaders’ performance plays a major role in the Chinese political system. These findings also illuminate the dilemma that local leaders face in managing popular nationalism amid shifting national priorities.
Nationalist Protests, Government Responses, and The Risk of Escalation in Interstate Disputes
Security Studies 25:3, July 2016 (with John D. Ciorciari) now ungated
While the existing literature emphasizes that elites often have incentives to pander to nationalist sentiment, much less attention has been paid to elite efforts to subdue popular nationalism, either to avoid unwanted domestic instability or international escalation. This article examines how different governments respond to nationalist protests and the resulting effects that such protests have on the risk that interstate disputes will escalate to armed conflict. We emphasize the importance of regime type, arguing that nationalist protests present particular dangers in transitional or hybrid regimes, where demonstrations often pose serious threats of instability but are difficult or costly for the government to subdue, tempting or forcing leaders to escalate to appease domestic critics. We illustrate the theory with four cases representing a range of regime types: Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and the Philippines.
Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining
Journal of Conflict Resolution 60:3, April 2016 (with Alexandre Debs), and OnlineFirst (2014). Ungated version
We present a new theory of interstate crisis bargaining. A country’s resolve is a function of intrinsic qualities of the government and external circumstances, both of which are unknown by the domestic electorate and the foreign country. When domestic political debate reveals that circumstances favor the use of force, the government can extract better terms than if circumstances are revealed to be unfavorable. The revelation of circumstances, however, exacerbates reputational incentives. Because governments can no longer hide behind unknown circumstances, voters can better discern the government’s type from its actions, strengthening the incentives to appear resolved. The model bridges the gap between audience costs and its critiques, showing how domestic audiences punish leaders for inappropriate policies rather than empty threats. At the same time, it highlights how the prospects for peace are worse if uncertainty about the circumstances is removed, suggesting that greater transparency does not always promote peaceful outcomes.
The Political Geography of Nationalist Protest in China: Cities and the 2012 Anti-Japanese Demonstrations
China Quarterly 222 (June 2015): 403-29 (with Jeremy Wallace). Ungated version. Replication files.
Why do some cities take part in waves of nationalist protest but not others? Nationalist protest remains an important but understudied topic within the study of contentious politics in China, particularly at the subnational level. Relative to other protests, nationalist mobilization is more clustered in time and geographically widespread, linking citizens across different cities against a common target. Although the literature has debated the degree of state-led and grassroots influence on Chinese nationalism, we argue that it is important to consider both citizen propensity to mobilize as well as local government fears of instability. Analyzing an original dataset of 377 anti-Japanese protests across 208 of 287 Chinese prefectural cities, we find that both state-led patriotism and the availability of collective action resources were positively associated with nationalist protest, particularly “biographically available” populations of students and migrants. In addition, the government’s role was not monolithically facilitative. Fears of social unrest shaped the local political opportunity structure, with anti-Japanese protests less likely in cities with larger populations of unemployed college graduates and ethnic minorities, and more likely in cities with established leaders.
Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China
International Organization 67:1, January 2013. (lead article) Ungated version
How can authoritarian states credibly signal their intentions in international crises? Although autocrats may be accountable to domestic elites, the literature has not specified a mechanism by which autocrats can visibly demonstrate their domestic constraints to foreign observers ex ante. Nationalist, anti-foreign protests are one such mechanism. Because protests in authoritarian states are risky and costly to repress, the decision to allow or stifle popular mobilization is informative and consequential. The threat of instability demonstrates resolve, and the cost of concession increases the credibility of a tough stance. Unlike audience costs, outside observers can directly observe nationalist demonstrations, which give outsiders an interest in making concessions to preserve the status quo. This logic helps explain the pattern of authoritarian tolerance and repression toward nationalist protest. A case study of two U.S.-China crises shows how China's management of anti-American protests affected U.S. beliefs about Chinese intentions.
The Sino-Vietnamese Standoff in the South China Sea
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Winter/Spring 2012. (with John D. Ciorciari)
Journal of East Asian Studies, 2023, 23, 387–410 (with Panle Jia Barwick, Shanjun Li, and Jeremy Wallace)
We explore whether international disputes harm commerce by galvanizing consumer boycotts of foreign products. Boycotts increase the social penalty of owning goods associated with a foreign adversary, offsetting individual incentives to free ride or discount the utility of participation. By harming international commerce, boycotts reveal information about resolve and help avoid more costly forms of conflict. We demonstrate that the consumer boycott that arose amid tensions between China and Japan over a territorial dispute in 2012 had significant and persistent effects, especially in cities that witnessed anti-Japanese street demonstrations. Using administrative data on every car registration in China from 2009 to 2015, we find that the market share of Japanese automobile brands dropped substantially while Chinese and American brands benefited, with effects lasting several years. Our analysis provides concrete evidence of the short- and long-term impact of international tensions on economic activities.
Provocation, Public Opinion, and International Disputes: Evidence from China
International Studies Quarterly, 2022 (with Allan Dafoe, Samuel Liu, and Brian O'Keefe)
What public pressures do leaders face in international disputes? Leaders often denounce foreign actions as provocations, triggering public anger and demands for restitution. Rather than generating a reflexive rally around the flag, we argue that leaders who invoke foreign provocations—whether hypothetical, remembered, exaggerated, or real—face heightened public disapproval if they fail to take tough action in the present. Across two survey experiments and a quasi-natural experiment involving US naval patrols in the South China Sea, we find that incidents construed as provocative increase public pressure on the Chinese government to respond or incur public disapproval. We discuss possible explanations, how government elites seek to mitigate public disapproval, and how such events can change the logic of coercion and deterrence.
Strong State or Vulnerable Homeland: How Chinese State Media Sought to Combat Democratic Diffusion During the 2019 Hong Kong Protests, Journal of Contemporary China, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2022.2052442 (with Shiqi Ma)
Departing from its typical silence on pro-democracy movements around the world, Chinese state media encouraged a flood of reports about the 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Movement in Hong Kong . This article investigates two different media framing strategies to prevent democratic diffusion: demobilizing the masses by emphasizing state capacity and repression, and rallying the masses by emphasizing threats to national unity. Analyzing an original dataset of articles about the Hong Kong protests in the People’s Daily, this article documents a greater overall reliance on the rallying strategy, a tendency that became particularly pronounced in the later stage of the protest movement. Chinese media selectively reported events that would emphasize threats and downplayed stories about repression.
Domestic Politics, China’s Rise, and the Future of the Liberal International Order
International Organization, 2021, 1-30, doi:10.1017/S002081832000048X. (with Jeremy Wallace) (PDF)
With the future of liberal internationalism in question, how will China’s growing power and influence reshape world politics? We argue that views of the liberal international order (LIO) as integrative and resilient have been too optimistic, for two reasons. First, China’s ability to profit from within the system has shaken the domestic consensus within the United States for preserving the LIO. Second, features of Chinese Communist Party rule chafe against many of the fundamental principles of the LIO but could coexist with a return to Westphalian principles and markets that are embedded in domestic systems of control. How, then, do authoritarian states like China pick and choose how to engage with key institutions and norms within the LIO? We propose a framework that highlights two domestic variables—centrality and heterogeneity—and their implications for China's international behavior. We illustrate the framework with examples from China’s approach to climate change, trade and exchange rates, internet governance, territorial sovereignty, arms control, and humanitarian intervention. Finally, we conclude by considering what alternative versions of international order might emerge as China’s influence grows.
“Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in the Routledge Handbook on Ideology in International Relations, ed. Mark L. Haas and Jonathan Leader Maynard, 2022. (with Eun A Jo*)
An Ideological Contest in U.S.-China Relations? Assessing China’s Defense of Autocracy
in After Engagement: Dilemmas in U.S.-China Security Relations, eds. Avery Goldstein and Jacques deLisle.
China’s renewed authoritarianism and growing international influence have paralleled democratic erosion in new and established democracies alike. These twin developments have added an ideological valence to growing security and trade tensions in U.S.-China relations. Although there is scant evidence that the Chinese Communist Party is deliberately trying to spread autocracy or defeat democracy, China’s success and influence have made the world safer for autocracy. The essay concludes by considering how U.S. actions might affect Beijing’s calculus and the future of competition between autocracy and democracy.
Getting Tough on China: Are Campaign Ads A Signal of Future Policy or Just Cheap Talk?
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12307 (with Amber Wichowsky) Ungated version
Is tough-on-China campaign rhetoric cheap talk or a signal of policy attention? Analyzing China-related campaign advertisements during the 2010 midterm elections and subsequent cosponsorship of China-related bills, we find that campaign ads are a noisy predictor of legislative attention. Challengers who attacked on China were more likely to cosponsor China-related legislation, while incumbents who were attacked for being soft on China took tougher positions on China after reelection. By demonstrating the correspondence between anti-China campaign appeals and subsequent legislative attention, our findings add to a growing body of evidence linking campaign rhetoric to members’ legislative agendas. This research note provides the first evidence demonstrating the connection between campaign appeals and legislative attention on a foreign policy issue like China.
Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China
International Studies Quarterly, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz059 (with Allan Dafoe). Ungated version. appendix
How do government rhetoric and propaganda affect mass reactions in international crises? Using two scenario-based survey experiments in China, one hypothetical and one that selectively reminds respondents of recent events, we assess how government statements and propaganda affect Chinese citizens' approval of their government's performance in its territorial and maritime disputes. We find evidence that citizens disapprove more of inaction after explicit threats to use force, suggesting that leaders can face public opinion costs akin to audience costs in an authoritarian setting. However, we also find evidence that citizens approve of bluster--vague and ultimately empty threats--suggesting that talking tough can provide benefits, even in the absence of tough action. In addition, narratives that invoke future success to justify present restraint increase approval, along with frames that emphasize a shared history of injustice at the hands of foreign powers.
Campaign Rhetoric and Chinese Reactions to New Leaders
Asian Security, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1651717 (with Kacie Miura). Ungated version.
Although China tends to be an important topic in election campaigns, the consequences of this rhetoric have not been systematically examined. We highlight the process by which China uses campaign rhetoric to make inferences about the intentions of new leaders in the US, Taiwan, and Japan. We identify two key criteria – consistency and change – that guide Chinese assessments. In turn, three patterns define Chinese policy toward new administrations: proactive engagement when campaign rhetoric is consistent with other indicators of policy change; reactive engagement when rhetoric is consistent with continuity; and a wait and see approach when rhetoric is inconsistent with the candidate’s past actions and the reputation of close advisors. Our findings push back against arguments linking leadership transitions to international conflict. Rather than testing the resolve of new leaders with military probes, foreign states can use information overheard during elections to gauge their counterparts’ intentions and ensure stability immediately after elections.
How hawkish is the Chinese public? Another look at “rising nationalism” and Chinese foreign policy
Journal of Contemporary China, 2019, 28: 119, 679-695. Ungated version.
Chinese leaders often invoke the feelings of the Chinese people in denouncing foreign actions in international confrontations. But most survey research on Chinese public opinion on international affairs has looked at measures of nationalist identity rather than beliefs about foreign policy and evaluations of the government’s performance. Five surveys of Chinese citizens, netizens, and elites help illuminate the public attitudes that the Chinese government grapples with in managing international security policy. The results show that Chinese attitudes are more hawkish than dovish and that younger Chinese, while perhaps not more nationalist in identity, may be more hawkish in their foreign policy beliefs than older generations. Netizens and elites are even more inclined to call on the Chinese government to invest and rely more on military strength.
External Influence on Exchange Rates: An Empirical Investigation of US Pressure and the Chinese RMB
Review of International Political Economy, 25:5, 596-623, December 2018 (with Amber Wichowsky). Ungated version.
Trade imbalances have often led to accusations of “currency manipulation” and efforts to remedy the purported effects of exchange rate misalignment. This paper investigates the impact of US pressure on China to revalue the RMB. Using vector autoregression (VAR) to analyze an original dataset of US statements and actions between 2005 and 2012, we examine the over-time dynamics between US pressure and the nominal RMB/USD exchange rate. A case study of mounting US pressure in advance of the 2010 midterm election illustrates China’s responsiveness in timing adjustments in the RMB to defuse the risk of an international confrontation. Our findings indicate that external political pressures can influence national exchange rate policies under certain conditions.
The Political and Economic Consequences of Nationalist Protest in China: The 2012 Anti-Japanese Demonstrations
China Quarterly, Volume 236, December 2018, 1131-1153 (with Kevin Foley and Jeremy Wallace). Ungated version.
What are the consequences of nationalist unrest? This paper utilizes original datasets of 377 city-level anti-Japanese protests during the 2012 Senkaku/Diaoyu Island crisis and of the careers of municipal leaders to analyze the downstream effects of nationalist unrest at the subnational level. We find both political and economic consequences of China’s 2012 protest demonstrations against Japan. Specifically, top party leaders in cities that saw relatively spontaneous, early protests were less likely to be promoted to higher office, consistent with the widely-held but rarely tested expectation that social instability is punished in the Chinese Communist Party’s cadre evaluation system. We also find a negative effect of nationalist protest on FDI growth at the city level. However, the lower promotion rates associated with relatively spontaneous protests seem to have arisen through political rather than economic channels. By taking into account data on social unrest in addition to economic performance, these results add to existing evidence that systematic evaluation of leaders’ performance plays a major role in the Chinese political system. These findings also illuminate the dilemma that local leaders face in managing popular nationalism amid shifting national priorities.
Nationalist Protests, Government Responses, and The Risk of Escalation in Interstate Disputes
Security Studies 25:3, July 2016 (with John D. Ciorciari) now ungated
While the existing literature emphasizes that elites often have incentives to pander to nationalist sentiment, much less attention has been paid to elite efforts to subdue popular nationalism, either to avoid unwanted domestic instability or international escalation. This article examines how different governments respond to nationalist protests and the resulting effects that such protests have on the risk that interstate disputes will escalate to armed conflict. We emphasize the importance of regime type, arguing that nationalist protests present particular dangers in transitional or hybrid regimes, where demonstrations often pose serious threats of instability but are difficult or costly for the government to subdue, tempting or forcing leaders to escalate to appease domestic critics. We illustrate the theory with four cases representing a range of regime types: Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and the Philippines.
Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining
Journal of Conflict Resolution 60:3, April 2016 (with Alexandre Debs), and OnlineFirst (2014). Ungated version
We present a new theory of interstate crisis bargaining. A country’s resolve is a function of intrinsic qualities of the government and external circumstances, both of which are unknown by the domestic electorate and the foreign country. When domestic political debate reveals that circumstances favor the use of force, the government can extract better terms than if circumstances are revealed to be unfavorable. The revelation of circumstances, however, exacerbates reputational incentives. Because governments can no longer hide behind unknown circumstances, voters can better discern the government’s type from its actions, strengthening the incentives to appear resolved. The model bridges the gap between audience costs and its critiques, showing how domestic audiences punish leaders for inappropriate policies rather than empty threats. At the same time, it highlights how the prospects for peace are worse if uncertainty about the circumstances is removed, suggesting that greater transparency does not always promote peaceful outcomes.
The Political Geography of Nationalist Protest in China: Cities and the 2012 Anti-Japanese Demonstrations
China Quarterly 222 (June 2015): 403-29 (with Jeremy Wallace). Ungated version. Replication files.
Why do some cities take part in waves of nationalist protest but not others? Nationalist protest remains an important but understudied topic within the study of contentious politics in China, particularly at the subnational level. Relative to other protests, nationalist mobilization is more clustered in time and geographically widespread, linking citizens across different cities against a common target. Although the literature has debated the degree of state-led and grassroots influence on Chinese nationalism, we argue that it is important to consider both citizen propensity to mobilize as well as local government fears of instability. Analyzing an original dataset of 377 anti-Japanese protests across 208 of 287 Chinese prefectural cities, we find that both state-led patriotism and the availability of collective action resources were positively associated with nationalist protest, particularly “biographically available” populations of students and migrants. In addition, the government’s role was not monolithically facilitative. Fears of social unrest shaped the local political opportunity structure, with anti-Japanese protests less likely in cities with larger populations of unemployed college graduates and ethnic minorities, and more likely in cities with established leaders.
Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China
International Organization 67:1, January 2013. (lead article) Ungated version
How can authoritarian states credibly signal their intentions in international crises? Although autocrats may be accountable to domestic elites, the literature has not specified a mechanism by which autocrats can visibly demonstrate their domestic constraints to foreign observers ex ante. Nationalist, anti-foreign protests are one such mechanism. Because protests in authoritarian states are risky and costly to repress, the decision to allow or stifle popular mobilization is informative and consequential. The threat of instability demonstrates resolve, and the cost of concession increases the credibility of a tough stance. Unlike audience costs, outside observers can directly observe nationalist demonstrations, which give outsiders an interest in making concessions to preserve the status quo. This logic helps explain the pattern of authoritarian tolerance and repression toward nationalist protest. A case study of two U.S.-China crises shows how China's management of anti-American protests affected U.S. beliefs about Chinese intentions.
The Sino-Vietnamese Standoff in the South China Sea
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Winter/Spring 2012. (with John D. Ciorciari)
Chapters, Roundtables, and Other Writing
"The Clash of Systems? Washington Should Avoid Ideological Competition With Beijing," Foreign Affairs, June 11, 2021 (with Tom Pepinsky).
"A World Safe for Autocracy? China's Rise and the Future of Global Politics," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2019.
China and the Future of World Politics, Perspectives on Politics, June 2017.
Will China Test Trump? Lessons From Past Campaigns and Elections, The Washington Quarterly (December 2016) with Kacie Miura.
Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics, in Emerging Trends in the Behavioral and Social Sciences, ed. Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn. Wiley & Sons, 2015.
Putting concepts into practice: a call for measuring and explaining variation in Chinese nationalism, in Nations and Nationalism (3), 2016, 415–446, ed. Allen Carlson and Anna Costa.
"A World Safe for Autocracy? China's Rise and the Future of Global Politics," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2019.
China and the Future of World Politics, Perspectives on Politics, June 2017.
Will China Test Trump? Lessons From Past Campaigns and Elections, The Washington Quarterly (December 2016) with Kacie Miura.
Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics, in Emerging Trends in the Behavioral and Social Sciences, ed. Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn. Wiley & Sons, 2015.
Putting concepts into practice: a call for measuring and explaining variation in Chinese nationalism, in Nations and Nationalism (3), 2016, 415–446, ed. Allen Carlson and Anna Costa.