Work in Progress
Citizens & the State in Authoritarian Regimes: Comparing Russia & China
with Valerie Bunce and Karrie Koesel, eds. under review
This book addresses three issues that currently animate debates in the academic and policy worlds about these two countries and, more generally, authoritarian regimes. First, how do authoritarian regimes differ from one another, and how do these differences affect regime-society relations? For example, because Vladimir Putin’s regime has maintained some of the institutions of Russia’s experiment with democracy in the 1990s, does that mean that his government is necessarily less repressive than the Xi Jinping’s government in China? If citizens choose their leaders through elections, as they do in many authoritarian regimes, including Russia, does this mean that they have more influence on public officials and public policy than citizens in authoritarian states, such as China, where leaders are selected through a more hidden and elitist process?
Second, what do citizens think about the authoritarian governments that rule them, and what do they want from their governments? Part of the issue here is whether popular compliance stems from active support of the regime or merely acquiescence as a result of the absence of political alternatives. The other part is the question of how much the citizenry value freedom, political order, national security and economic benefits, and how their political and economic experiences have shaped both their rankings of these goals and their sense of trade-offs among them. To provide some examples from our two cases: do citizens in China and Russia value economic benefits far more than democracy; do they in fact see a trade-off between the two; and is their support of the regime conditional on its ability to meet economic expectations and deliver political order?
Finally, what strategies do authoritarian leaders use to keep citizens and public officials in line and how successful are those strategies in sustaining both the regime and the leader’s hold on power? Authoritarian rulers have a variety of options for maintaining power—for instance, they can appeal to shared values, inculcate fear, distribute economic benefits, or appear so powerful that going along with the regime is the only alternative available to citizens and public officials. The problem for China and Russia, as for all authoritarian regimes, is that every strategy has costs and benefits. For instance, repression makes dissent quite costly and therefore encourages political conformity in the short-term. From a longer-term perspective, however, repression discourages fearful citizens and public officials from providing useful information to the regime. As a result, economic performance can suffer; resentments against the regime can mount; and political leaders, having been kept in the dark about the impact of their policies and the true sentiments of the citizenry and members of the ruling circle, can be caught by surprise when citizens take to the streets and public officials defect from the regime.
Provocation, Public Opinion, and Crisis Escalation: Evidence from China
(with Allan Dafoe) under review
Crises frequently escalate from provocations--materially insignificant actions or incidents that stimulate resolve to defend the nation and retaliate against perceived transgressions. Leaders often invoke the language of provocation to explain why their public demands restitution and tough action. Are they bluffing? We theorize that foreign provocative actions--such as insults, non-militarized escalation, fatalities, and symbolic shows of force--can increase public disapproval of the government for not taking strong countermeasures. We employ two kinds of scenario-based survey experiments--the first involving a hypothetical scenario, the second involving the selective presentation of historical events--to evaluate how provocative events affect Chinese citizens' resolve and approval of their government's foreign policy performance. We also exploit a natural experiment by deploying these surveys during the days surrounding US military patrols in the South China Sea. We find evidence consistent with our theory. Citizens disapprove of government inaction in the face of provocative actions, potentially tying the government's hands by creating incentives to escalate international crises. The phenomenon of provocation reduces the efficacy of coercive tactics and alters bargaining dynamics.
Campaign Rhetoric and Chinese Reactions to New Leaders
(with Kacie Miura) under review
How does campaign rhetoric shape foreign perceptions and reactions to the election of new leaders? Two primary factors guide Chinese beliefs and behavior toward new leaders in the United States, Japan, and Taiwan. First is the degree of consistency between campaign rhetoric and other indicators of a candidate’s likely policy toward China; second is the degree of change from the policies of the past administration. China adopts a wait-and-see approach toward leaders whose campaign rhetoric is inconsistent; a proactive approach toward leaders whose campaign rhetoric is consistent with indicators of change in either a hawkish or dovish direction; and a status quo orientation toward leaders whose campaign rhetoric is consistent with continuity in China policy. China does not probe or test the resolve of new leaders, nor does it dismiss campaign remarks outright or mistake them for policy, contrary to common assumptions about how authoritarian states understand democratic leadership transitions.
Consumer Casualties: Political Boycotts and International Disputes
(with Panle Jia Barwick, Shanjun Li, and Jeremy Wallace)
We explore whether international disputes harm commerce by galvanizing consumer boycotts of foreign products. Boycotts increase the social penalty of owning goods associated with a foreign adversary, offsetting individual incentives to free ride or discount the utility of participation. By harming international commerce, boycotts reveal information about resolve and help avoid more costly forms of conflict. We demonstrate that the consumer boycott that arose amid tensions between China and Japan over a territorial dispute in 2012 had significant and persistent effects, especially in cities that witnessed anti-Japanese street demonstrations. Using administrative data on every car registration in China from 2009 to 2015, we find that the market share of Japanese automobile brands dropped substantially while Chinese and American brands benefited, with effects lasting several years. Our analysis provides concrete evidence of the short- and long-term impact of international tensions on economic activities.
China's Enigmatic Environmentalism
(with Jeremy Wallace)
How will China’s rise reshape global governance? Political developments in the United States and Europe have called into question the durability of the liberal international order. As that consensus wanes, we argue for a closer examination of the domestic drivers of China’s international behavior and willingness to contribute to global public goods, particularly the environment. Existing approaches to mitigating climate change have assumed that “autocracies are unlikely to take the lead on this issue; and as long as the United States fails to act effectively, they will have a good excuse, avoiding harm to their reputations. US action is a necessary—probably not sufficient—condition for China, the biggest emitter, to take mitigation seriously.” (Keohane, 2015, p. 23) China’s emergence as a leader on climate change, while remaining a laggard on other environmental issues, illustrates the utility of an analytic focus on domestic incentives stemming from political economy, contingency, and geography. These factors shape an emerging Chinese model of international leadership and public goods provision, one rooted in private (domestic) benefits.
More than Cheap Talk: U.S. Campaign Rhetoric and Congressional Activity on China
(with Amber Wichowsky)
Is China-bashing on the campaign trail more than just "cheap talk"? If campaign appeals are reliable indicators of future legislative activity, then democratic signals may be less noisy than cynics complain, adding micro-level evidence of democratic credibility in international politics. While not the intended audience of campaign ads, Chinese policymakers may overhear and draw inferences about U.S. policy. We show that when challengers attacked on the campaign trail during the 2010 midterm elections, successful challengers and victorious incumbents were subsequently more likely to sponsor anti-China legislation.
Diversionary Gambles and Nationalist Protests in International Crisis Bargaining
(with Alexandre Debs)
We investigate the conditions under which diversionary war can result from the strategic interaction of rational governments and investigate the effect of nationalist protests on international crisis bargaining. We illustrate our results with two case studies, the Falklands War of 1982 and the recent tensions between China and Japan in the East China Sea.
with Valerie Bunce and Karrie Koesel, eds. under review
This book addresses three issues that currently animate debates in the academic and policy worlds about these two countries and, more generally, authoritarian regimes. First, how do authoritarian regimes differ from one another, and how do these differences affect regime-society relations? For example, because Vladimir Putin’s regime has maintained some of the institutions of Russia’s experiment with democracy in the 1990s, does that mean that his government is necessarily less repressive than the Xi Jinping’s government in China? If citizens choose their leaders through elections, as they do in many authoritarian regimes, including Russia, does this mean that they have more influence on public officials and public policy than citizens in authoritarian states, such as China, where leaders are selected through a more hidden and elitist process?
Second, what do citizens think about the authoritarian governments that rule them, and what do they want from their governments? Part of the issue here is whether popular compliance stems from active support of the regime or merely acquiescence as a result of the absence of political alternatives. The other part is the question of how much the citizenry value freedom, political order, national security and economic benefits, and how their political and economic experiences have shaped both their rankings of these goals and their sense of trade-offs among them. To provide some examples from our two cases: do citizens in China and Russia value economic benefits far more than democracy; do they in fact see a trade-off between the two; and is their support of the regime conditional on its ability to meet economic expectations and deliver political order?
Finally, what strategies do authoritarian leaders use to keep citizens and public officials in line and how successful are those strategies in sustaining both the regime and the leader’s hold on power? Authoritarian rulers have a variety of options for maintaining power—for instance, they can appeal to shared values, inculcate fear, distribute economic benefits, or appear so powerful that going along with the regime is the only alternative available to citizens and public officials. The problem for China and Russia, as for all authoritarian regimes, is that every strategy has costs and benefits. For instance, repression makes dissent quite costly and therefore encourages political conformity in the short-term. From a longer-term perspective, however, repression discourages fearful citizens and public officials from providing useful information to the regime. As a result, economic performance can suffer; resentments against the regime can mount; and political leaders, having been kept in the dark about the impact of their policies and the true sentiments of the citizenry and members of the ruling circle, can be caught by surprise when citizens take to the streets and public officials defect from the regime.
Provocation, Public Opinion, and Crisis Escalation: Evidence from China
(with Allan Dafoe) under review
Crises frequently escalate from provocations--materially insignificant actions or incidents that stimulate resolve to defend the nation and retaliate against perceived transgressions. Leaders often invoke the language of provocation to explain why their public demands restitution and tough action. Are they bluffing? We theorize that foreign provocative actions--such as insults, non-militarized escalation, fatalities, and symbolic shows of force--can increase public disapproval of the government for not taking strong countermeasures. We employ two kinds of scenario-based survey experiments--the first involving a hypothetical scenario, the second involving the selective presentation of historical events--to evaluate how provocative events affect Chinese citizens' resolve and approval of their government's foreign policy performance. We also exploit a natural experiment by deploying these surveys during the days surrounding US military patrols in the South China Sea. We find evidence consistent with our theory. Citizens disapprove of government inaction in the face of provocative actions, potentially tying the government's hands by creating incentives to escalate international crises. The phenomenon of provocation reduces the efficacy of coercive tactics and alters bargaining dynamics.
Campaign Rhetoric and Chinese Reactions to New Leaders
(with Kacie Miura) under review
How does campaign rhetoric shape foreign perceptions and reactions to the election of new leaders? Two primary factors guide Chinese beliefs and behavior toward new leaders in the United States, Japan, and Taiwan. First is the degree of consistency between campaign rhetoric and other indicators of a candidate’s likely policy toward China; second is the degree of change from the policies of the past administration. China adopts a wait-and-see approach toward leaders whose campaign rhetoric is inconsistent; a proactive approach toward leaders whose campaign rhetoric is consistent with indicators of change in either a hawkish or dovish direction; and a status quo orientation toward leaders whose campaign rhetoric is consistent with continuity in China policy. China does not probe or test the resolve of new leaders, nor does it dismiss campaign remarks outright or mistake them for policy, contrary to common assumptions about how authoritarian states understand democratic leadership transitions.
Consumer Casualties: Political Boycotts and International Disputes
(with Panle Jia Barwick, Shanjun Li, and Jeremy Wallace)
We explore whether international disputes harm commerce by galvanizing consumer boycotts of foreign products. Boycotts increase the social penalty of owning goods associated with a foreign adversary, offsetting individual incentives to free ride or discount the utility of participation. By harming international commerce, boycotts reveal information about resolve and help avoid more costly forms of conflict. We demonstrate that the consumer boycott that arose amid tensions between China and Japan over a territorial dispute in 2012 had significant and persistent effects, especially in cities that witnessed anti-Japanese street demonstrations. Using administrative data on every car registration in China from 2009 to 2015, we find that the market share of Japanese automobile brands dropped substantially while Chinese and American brands benefited, with effects lasting several years. Our analysis provides concrete evidence of the short- and long-term impact of international tensions on economic activities.
China's Enigmatic Environmentalism
(with Jeremy Wallace)
How will China’s rise reshape global governance? Political developments in the United States and Europe have called into question the durability of the liberal international order. As that consensus wanes, we argue for a closer examination of the domestic drivers of China’s international behavior and willingness to contribute to global public goods, particularly the environment. Existing approaches to mitigating climate change have assumed that “autocracies are unlikely to take the lead on this issue; and as long as the United States fails to act effectively, they will have a good excuse, avoiding harm to their reputations. US action is a necessary—probably not sufficient—condition for China, the biggest emitter, to take mitigation seriously.” (Keohane, 2015, p. 23) China’s emergence as a leader on climate change, while remaining a laggard on other environmental issues, illustrates the utility of an analytic focus on domestic incentives stemming from political economy, contingency, and geography. These factors shape an emerging Chinese model of international leadership and public goods provision, one rooted in private (domestic) benefits.
More than Cheap Talk: U.S. Campaign Rhetoric and Congressional Activity on China
(with Amber Wichowsky)
Is China-bashing on the campaign trail more than just "cheap talk"? If campaign appeals are reliable indicators of future legislative activity, then democratic signals may be less noisy than cynics complain, adding micro-level evidence of democratic credibility in international politics. While not the intended audience of campaign ads, Chinese policymakers may overhear and draw inferences about U.S. policy. We show that when challengers attacked on the campaign trail during the 2010 midterm elections, successful challengers and victorious incumbents were subsequently more likely to sponsor anti-China legislation.
Diversionary Gambles and Nationalist Protests in International Crisis Bargaining
(with Alexandre Debs)
We investigate the conditions under which diversionary war can result from the strategic interaction of rational governments and investigate the effect of nationalist protests on international crisis bargaining. We illustrate our results with two case studies, the Falklands War of 1982 and the recent tensions between China and Japan in the East China Sea.