Work in Progress
Domestic Politics, China’s Rise, and Challenges to the Liberal International Order
(with Jeremy Wallace) forthcoming, International Organization, 75th anniversary special issue
With the future of liberal internationalism in question, how will China’s growing power and influence reshape world politics? We argue that views of the liberal international order (LIO) as integrative and resilient have been too optimistic, for two reasons. First, China’s ability to profit from within the system has undermined the liberal hegemon’s own interest in preserving the LIO. Second, features of Chinese Communist Party rule chafe against many of the fundamental principles of the LIO but could coexist with a return to Westphalian principles and markets that are embedded in domestic systems of control. How, then, do authoritarian states like China pick and choose how to engage with key institutions and norms within the LIO? We propose a framework that highlights two domestic variables—centrality and heterogeneity—and their implications for China's international behavior. We illustrate the framework with examples from China’s approach to climate change, trade and exchange rates, internet governance, territorial sovereignty, arms control, and humanitarian intervention. Finally, we conclude by considering what alternative versions of international order might emerge as China’s influence grows.
An Ideological Contest in U.S.-China Relations? Assessing China’s Defense of Autocracy
Chapter submitted for inclusion in Security and US-China Relations: Differences, Dangers, and Dilemmas, eds. Avery Goldstein and Jacques deLisle.
China’s renewed authoritarianism and growing international influence have paralleled democratic erosion in new and established democracies alike. These twin developments have added an ideological valence to growing security and trade tensions in U.S.-China relations. Although there is scant evidence that the Chinese Communist Party is deliberately trying to spread autocracy or defeat democracy, China’s success and influence have made the world safer for autocracy. The essay concludes by considering how U.S. actions might affect Beijing’s calculus and the future of competition between autocracy and democracy.
Citizens & the State in Authoritarian Regimes: Comparing China & Russia
with Karrie Koesel and Valerie Bunce, eds. forthcoming (March 2020), Oxford University Press
Citizens and the State in Authoritarian Regimes compares the most powerful authoritarian states in global politics today: Russia and China. By placing China and Russia side-by-side, this volume produces new insights, including what strategies their rulers have used to stay in power while forging political stability and gathering information; how societal groups have resisted, complied, or responded to these strategies; and what costs and benefits, anticipated and unexpected, have accompanied the bargains political leaders and their societies have struck. The essays in this volume change the way we understand authoritarian politics and expand the terrain of how we analyze regime-society relations in authoritarian states.
Getting Tough on China: Are Campaign Ads A Signal of Future Policy or Just Cheap Talk?
(with Amber Wichowsky) conditional accept, Legislative Studies Quarterly
Is tough-on-China campaign rhetoric cheap talk or a signal of policy attention? Analyzing China-related campaign advertisements during the 2010 midterm elections and subsequent cosponsorship of China-related bills, we find that campaign ads are a noisy predictor of legislative attention. Challengers who attacked on China were more likely to cosponsor China-related legislation, while incumbents who were attacked for being soft on China took tougher positions on China after reelection. By demonstrating the correspondence between anti-China campaign appeals and subsequent legislative attention, our findings add to a growing body of evidence linking campaign rhetoric to members’ legislative agendas. This research note provides the first evidence demonstrating the connection between campaign appeals and legislative attention on a foreign policy issue like China.
Consumer Casualties: Political Boycotts and International Disputes
(with Panle Jia Barwick, Shanjun Li, and Jeremy Wallace) under review
We explore whether international disputes harm commerce by galvanizing consumer boycotts of foreign products. Boycotts increase the social penalty of owning goods associated with a foreign adversary, offsetting individual incentives to free ride or discount the utility of participation. By harming international commerce, boycotts reveal information about resolve and help avoid more costly forms of conflict. We demonstrate that the consumer boycott that arose amid tensions between China and Japan over a territorial dispute in 2012 had significant and persistent effects, especially in cities that witnessed anti-Japanese street demonstrations. Using administrative data on every car registration in China from 2009 to 2015, we find that the market share of Japanese automobile brands dropped substantially while Chinese and American brands benefited, with effects lasting several years. Our analysis provides concrete evidence of the short- and long-term impact of international tensions on economic activities.
Rallying and Dividing: Nationalism and China’s Urban-Rural Gap
(with R. Lincoln Hines and Jeremy Wallace) under review
Observers of Chinese politics have become inured to the frequent incantation that the regime's legitimacy rests on a combination of strong economic performance and nationalist credentials. Yet strong economic growth in China has been accompanied by rising divisions between the rich and the poor, the coastal and the interior, and between urban and rural residents. Do nationalist appeals increase domestic unity--papering over within-China divisions, including the urban-rural gap? Or can they have unintended consequences such as exacerbating antagonisms toward domestic varieties of `other'?
We explore these questions by carrying out a survey experiment (N=996) in China using actual nationalist rhetoric utilized by the Chinese Communist Party. We find that although nationalism can reduce domestic grievances, it can simultaneously exacerbate
domestic social divisions, leading educated elites to be less supportive of social policies that benefit migrant workers. This analysis provides suggestive evidence that nationalist strategies may have mixed and unintended consequences, both pacifying grievances, while also exacerbating domestic cleavages.
Provocation, Public Opinion, and Crisis Escalation: Evidence from China
(with Allan Dafoe)
Crises frequently escalate from provocations--materially insignificant actions or incidents that stimulate resolve to defend the nation and retaliate against perceived transgressions. Leaders often invoke the language of provocation to explain why their public demands restitution and tough action. Are they bluffing? We theorize that foreign provocative actions--such as insults, non-militarized escalation, fatalities, and symbolic shows of force--can increase public disapproval of the government for not taking strong countermeasures. We employ two kinds of scenario-based survey experiments--the first involving a hypothetical scenario, the second involving the selective presentation of historical events--to evaluate how provocative events affect Chinese citizens' resolve and approval of their government's foreign policy performance. We also exploit a natural experiment by deploying these surveys during the days surrounding US military patrols in the South China Sea. We find evidence consistent with our theory. Citizens disapprove of government inaction in the face of provocative actions, potentially tying the government's hands by creating incentives to escalate international crises. The phenomenon of provocation reduces the efficacy of coercive tactics and alters bargaining dynamics.
China’s Enigmatic Environmentalism: The Domestic Politics of China's Approach to International Order
(with Jeremy Wallace)
How will China’s rise reshape global governance? We argue for a closer examination of the domestic drivers of China’s international behavior and willingness to contribute to global public goods, particularly the environment. Existing approaches to mitigating climate change have assumed that “autocracies are unlikely to take the lead on this issue; and as long as the United States fails to act effectively, they will have a good excuse, avoiding harm to their reputations. US action is a necessary—probably not sufficient—condition for China, the biggest emitter, to take mitigation seriously.” (Keohane, 2015, p. 23) China’s emergence as a leader on climate change, while remaining a laggard on other environmental issues, illustrates the utility of an analytic focus on domestic incentives stemming from political economy, contingency, and geography. These factors shape an emerging Chinese model of international leadership and public goods provision, one rooted in private (domestic) benefits.
Diversionary Gambles and Nationalist Protests in International Crisis Bargaining
(with Alexandre Debs)
We investigate the conditions under which diversionary war can result from the strategic interaction of rational governments and investigate the effect of nationalist protests on international crisis bargaining. We illustrate our results with two case studies, the Falklands War of 1982 and the recent tensions between China and Japan in the East China Sea.
(with Jeremy Wallace) forthcoming, International Organization, 75th anniversary special issue
With the future of liberal internationalism in question, how will China’s growing power and influence reshape world politics? We argue that views of the liberal international order (LIO) as integrative and resilient have been too optimistic, for two reasons. First, China’s ability to profit from within the system has undermined the liberal hegemon’s own interest in preserving the LIO. Second, features of Chinese Communist Party rule chafe against many of the fundamental principles of the LIO but could coexist with a return to Westphalian principles and markets that are embedded in domestic systems of control. How, then, do authoritarian states like China pick and choose how to engage with key institutions and norms within the LIO? We propose a framework that highlights two domestic variables—centrality and heterogeneity—and their implications for China's international behavior. We illustrate the framework with examples from China’s approach to climate change, trade and exchange rates, internet governance, territorial sovereignty, arms control, and humanitarian intervention. Finally, we conclude by considering what alternative versions of international order might emerge as China’s influence grows.
An Ideological Contest in U.S.-China Relations? Assessing China’s Defense of Autocracy
Chapter submitted for inclusion in Security and US-China Relations: Differences, Dangers, and Dilemmas, eds. Avery Goldstein and Jacques deLisle.
China’s renewed authoritarianism and growing international influence have paralleled democratic erosion in new and established democracies alike. These twin developments have added an ideological valence to growing security and trade tensions in U.S.-China relations. Although there is scant evidence that the Chinese Communist Party is deliberately trying to spread autocracy or defeat democracy, China’s success and influence have made the world safer for autocracy. The essay concludes by considering how U.S. actions might affect Beijing’s calculus and the future of competition between autocracy and democracy.
Citizens & the State in Authoritarian Regimes: Comparing China & Russia
with Karrie Koesel and Valerie Bunce, eds. forthcoming (March 2020), Oxford University Press
Citizens and the State in Authoritarian Regimes compares the most powerful authoritarian states in global politics today: Russia and China. By placing China and Russia side-by-side, this volume produces new insights, including what strategies their rulers have used to stay in power while forging political stability and gathering information; how societal groups have resisted, complied, or responded to these strategies; and what costs and benefits, anticipated and unexpected, have accompanied the bargains political leaders and their societies have struck. The essays in this volume change the way we understand authoritarian politics and expand the terrain of how we analyze regime-society relations in authoritarian states.
Getting Tough on China: Are Campaign Ads A Signal of Future Policy or Just Cheap Talk?
(with Amber Wichowsky) conditional accept, Legislative Studies Quarterly
Is tough-on-China campaign rhetoric cheap talk or a signal of policy attention? Analyzing China-related campaign advertisements during the 2010 midterm elections and subsequent cosponsorship of China-related bills, we find that campaign ads are a noisy predictor of legislative attention. Challengers who attacked on China were more likely to cosponsor China-related legislation, while incumbents who were attacked for being soft on China took tougher positions on China after reelection. By demonstrating the correspondence between anti-China campaign appeals and subsequent legislative attention, our findings add to a growing body of evidence linking campaign rhetoric to members’ legislative agendas. This research note provides the first evidence demonstrating the connection between campaign appeals and legislative attention on a foreign policy issue like China.
Consumer Casualties: Political Boycotts and International Disputes
(with Panle Jia Barwick, Shanjun Li, and Jeremy Wallace) under review
We explore whether international disputes harm commerce by galvanizing consumer boycotts of foreign products. Boycotts increase the social penalty of owning goods associated with a foreign adversary, offsetting individual incentives to free ride or discount the utility of participation. By harming international commerce, boycotts reveal information about resolve and help avoid more costly forms of conflict. We demonstrate that the consumer boycott that arose amid tensions between China and Japan over a territorial dispute in 2012 had significant and persistent effects, especially in cities that witnessed anti-Japanese street demonstrations. Using administrative data on every car registration in China from 2009 to 2015, we find that the market share of Japanese automobile brands dropped substantially while Chinese and American brands benefited, with effects lasting several years. Our analysis provides concrete evidence of the short- and long-term impact of international tensions on economic activities.
Rallying and Dividing: Nationalism and China’s Urban-Rural Gap
(with R. Lincoln Hines and Jeremy Wallace) under review
Observers of Chinese politics have become inured to the frequent incantation that the regime's legitimacy rests on a combination of strong economic performance and nationalist credentials. Yet strong economic growth in China has been accompanied by rising divisions between the rich and the poor, the coastal and the interior, and between urban and rural residents. Do nationalist appeals increase domestic unity--papering over within-China divisions, including the urban-rural gap? Or can they have unintended consequences such as exacerbating antagonisms toward domestic varieties of `other'?
We explore these questions by carrying out a survey experiment (N=996) in China using actual nationalist rhetoric utilized by the Chinese Communist Party. We find that although nationalism can reduce domestic grievances, it can simultaneously exacerbate
domestic social divisions, leading educated elites to be less supportive of social policies that benefit migrant workers. This analysis provides suggestive evidence that nationalist strategies may have mixed and unintended consequences, both pacifying grievances, while also exacerbating domestic cleavages.
Provocation, Public Opinion, and Crisis Escalation: Evidence from China
(with Allan Dafoe)
Crises frequently escalate from provocations--materially insignificant actions or incidents that stimulate resolve to defend the nation and retaliate against perceived transgressions. Leaders often invoke the language of provocation to explain why their public demands restitution and tough action. Are they bluffing? We theorize that foreign provocative actions--such as insults, non-militarized escalation, fatalities, and symbolic shows of force--can increase public disapproval of the government for not taking strong countermeasures. We employ two kinds of scenario-based survey experiments--the first involving a hypothetical scenario, the second involving the selective presentation of historical events--to evaluate how provocative events affect Chinese citizens' resolve and approval of their government's foreign policy performance. We also exploit a natural experiment by deploying these surveys during the days surrounding US military patrols in the South China Sea. We find evidence consistent with our theory. Citizens disapprove of government inaction in the face of provocative actions, potentially tying the government's hands by creating incentives to escalate international crises. The phenomenon of provocation reduces the efficacy of coercive tactics and alters bargaining dynamics.
China’s Enigmatic Environmentalism: The Domestic Politics of China's Approach to International Order
(with Jeremy Wallace)
How will China’s rise reshape global governance? We argue for a closer examination of the domestic drivers of China’s international behavior and willingness to contribute to global public goods, particularly the environment. Existing approaches to mitigating climate change have assumed that “autocracies are unlikely to take the lead on this issue; and as long as the United States fails to act effectively, they will have a good excuse, avoiding harm to their reputations. US action is a necessary—probably not sufficient—condition for China, the biggest emitter, to take mitigation seriously.” (Keohane, 2015, p. 23) China’s emergence as a leader on climate change, while remaining a laggard on other environmental issues, illustrates the utility of an analytic focus on domestic incentives stemming from political economy, contingency, and geography. These factors shape an emerging Chinese model of international leadership and public goods provision, one rooted in private (domestic) benefits.
Diversionary Gambles and Nationalist Protests in International Crisis Bargaining
(with Alexandre Debs)
We investigate the conditions under which diversionary war can result from the strategic interaction of rational governments and investigate the effect of nationalist protests on international crisis bargaining. We illustrate our results with two case studies, the Falklands War of 1982 and the recent tensions between China and Japan in the East China Sea.