Work in Progress
Consumer Casualties: Political Boycotts and International Disputes
(with Panle Jia Barwick, Shanjun Li, and Jeremy Wallace) under review
We explore whether international disputes harm commerce by galvanizing consumer boycotts of foreign products. Boycotts increase the social penalty of owning goods associated with a foreign adversary, offsetting individual incentives to free ride or discount the utility of participation. By harming international commerce, boycotts reveal information about resolve and help avoid more costly forms of conflict. We demonstrate that the consumer boycott that arose amid tensions between China and Japan over a territorial dispute in 2012 had significant and persistent effects, especially in cities that witnessed anti-Japanese street demonstrations. Using administrative data on every car registration in China from 2009 to 2015, we find that the market share of Japanese automobile brands dropped substantially while Chinese and American brands benefited, with effects lasting several years. Our analysis provides concrete evidence of the short- and long-term impact of international tensions on economic activities.
Rallying and Dividing: Nationalism and China’s Urban-Rural Gap
(with R. Lincoln Hines and Jeremy Wallace) under review
Observers of Chinese politics have become inured to the frequent incantation that the regime's legitimacy rests on a combination of strong economic performance and nationalist credentials. Yet strong economic growth in China has been accompanied by rising divisions between the rich and the poor, the coastal and the interior, and between urban and rural residents. Do nationalist appeals increase domestic unity--papering over within-China divisions, including the urban-rural gap? Or can they have unintended consequences such as exacerbating antagonisms toward domestic varieties of `other'?
We explore these questions by carrying out a survey experiment (N=996) in China using actual nationalist rhetoric utilized by the Chinese Communist Party. We find that although nationalism can reduce domestic grievances, it can simultaneously exacerbate
domestic social divisions, leading educated elites to be less supportive of social policies that benefit migrant workers. This analysis provides suggestive evidence that nationalist strategies may have mixed and unintended consequences, both pacifying grievances, while also exacerbating domestic cleavages.
Provocation, Public Opinion, and Crisis Escalation: Evidence from China
(with Allan Dafoe) under review
Crises frequently escalate from provocations--materially insignificant actions or incidents that stimulate resolve to defend the nation and retaliate against perceived transgressions. Leaders often invoke the language of provocation to explain why their public demands restitution and tough action. Are they bluffing? We theorize that foreign provocative actions--such as insults, non-militarized escalation, fatalities, and symbolic shows of force--can increase public disapproval of the government for not taking strong countermeasures. We employ two kinds of scenario-based survey experiments--the first involving a hypothetical scenario, the second involving the selective presentation of historical events--to evaluate how provocative events affect Chinese citizens' resolve and approval of their government's foreign policy performance. We also exploit a natural experiment by deploying these surveys during the days surrounding US military patrols in the South China Sea. We find evidence consistent with our theory. Citizens disapprove of government inaction in the face of provocative actions, potentially tying the government's hands by creating incentives to escalate international crises. The phenomenon of provocation reduces the efficacy of coercive tactics and alters bargaining dynamics.
China’s Enigmatic Environmentalism: The Domestic Politics of China's Approach to International Order
(with Jeremy Wallace)
How will China’s rise reshape global governance? We argue for a closer examination of the domestic drivers of China’s international behavior and willingness to contribute to global public goods, particularly the environment. Existing approaches to mitigating climate change have assumed that “autocracies are unlikely to take the lead on this issue; and as long as the United States fails to act effectively, they will have a good excuse, avoiding harm to their reputations. US action is a necessary—probably not sufficient—condition for China, the biggest emitter, to take mitigation seriously.” (Keohane, 2015, p. 23) China’s emergence as a leader on climate change, while remaining a laggard on other environmental issues, illustrates the utility of an analytic focus on domestic incentives stemming from political economy, contingency, and geography. These factors shape an emerging Chinese model of international leadership and public goods provision, one rooted in private (domestic) benefits.
Diversionary Gambles and Nationalist Protests in International Crisis Bargaining
(with Alexandre Debs)
We investigate the conditions under which diversionary war can result from the strategic interaction of rational governments and investigate the effect of nationalist protests on international crisis bargaining. We illustrate our results with two case studies, the Falklands War of 1982 and the recent tensions between China and Japan in the East China Sea.
(with Panle Jia Barwick, Shanjun Li, and Jeremy Wallace) under review
We explore whether international disputes harm commerce by galvanizing consumer boycotts of foreign products. Boycotts increase the social penalty of owning goods associated with a foreign adversary, offsetting individual incentives to free ride or discount the utility of participation. By harming international commerce, boycotts reveal information about resolve and help avoid more costly forms of conflict. We demonstrate that the consumer boycott that arose amid tensions between China and Japan over a territorial dispute in 2012 had significant and persistent effects, especially in cities that witnessed anti-Japanese street demonstrations. Using administrative data on every car registration in China from 2009 to 2015, we find that the market share of Japanese automobile brands dropped substantially while Chinese and American brands benefited, with effects lasting several years. Our analysis provides concrete evidence of the short- and long-term impact of international tensions on economic activities.
Rallying and Dividing: Nationalism and China’s Urban-Rural Gap
(with R. Lincoln Hines and Jeremy Wallace) under review
Observers of Chinese politics have become inured to the frequent incantation that the regime's legitimacy rests on a combination of strong economic performance and nationalist credentials. Yet strong economic growth in China has been accompanied by rising divisions between the rich and the poor, the coastal and the interior, and between urban and rural residents. Do nationalist appeals increase domestic unity--papering over within-China divisions, including the urban-rural gap? Or can they have unintended consequences such as exacerbating antagonisms toward domestic varieties of `other'?
We explore these questions by carrying out a survey experiment (N=996) in China using actual nationalist rhetoric utilized by the Chinese Communist Party. We find that although nationalism can reduce domestic grievances, it can simultaneously exacerbate
domestic social divisions, leading educated elites to be less supportive of social policies that benefit migrant workers. This analysis provides suggestive evidence that nationalist strategies may have mixed and unintended consequences, both pacifying grievances, while also exacerbating domestic cleavages.
Provocation, Public Opinion, and Crisis Escalation: Evidence from China
(with Allan Dafoe) under review
Crises frequently escalate from provocations--materially insignificant actions or incidents that stimulate resolve to defend the nation and retaliate against perceived transgressions. Leaders often invoke the language of provocation to explain why their public demands restitution and tough action. Are they bluffing? We theorize that foreign provocative actions--such as insults, non-militarized escalation, fatalities, and symbolic shows of force--can increase public disapproval of the government for not taking strong countermeasures. We employ two kinds of scenario-based survey experiments--the first involving a hypothetical scenario, the second involving the selective presentation of historical events--to evaluate how provocative events affect Chinese citizens' resolve and approval of their government's foreign policy performance. We also exploit a natural experiment by deploying these surveys during the days surrounding US military patrols in the South China Sea. We find evidence consistent with our theory. Citizens disapprove of government inaction in the face of provocative actions, potentially tying the government's hands by creating incentives to escalate international crises. The phenomenon of provocation reduces the efficacy of coercive tactics and alters bargaining dynamics.
China’s Enigmatic Environmentalism: The Domestic Politics of China's Approach to International Order
(with Jeremy Wallace)
How will China’s rise reshape global governance? We argue for a closer examination of the domestic drivers of China’s international behavior and willingness to contribute to global public goods, particularly the environment. Existing approaches to mitigating climate change have assumed that “autocracies are unlikely to take the lead on this issue; and as long as the United States fails to act effectively, they will have a good excuse, avoiding harm to their reputations. US action is a necessary—probably not sufficient—condition for China, the biggest emitter, to take mitigation seriously.” (Keohane, 2015, p. 23) China’s emergence as a leader on climate change, while remaining a laggard on other environmental issues, illustrates the utility of an analytic focus on domestic incentives stemming from political economy, contingency, and geography. These factors shape an emerging Chinese model of international leadership and public goods provision, one rooted in private (domestic) benefits.
Diversionary Gambles and Nationalist Protests in International Crisis Bargaining
(with Alexandre Debs)
We investigate the conditions under which diversionary war can result from the strategic interaction of rational governments and investigate the effect of nationalist protests on international crisis bargaining. We illustrate our results with two case studies, the Falklands War of 1982 and the recent tensions between China and Japan in the East China Sea.