Work in Progress
The Political and Economic Consequences of Nationalist Protest in China: Repercussions of the 2012 Anti-Japanese Demonstrations (with Kevin Foley and Jeremy Wallace) conditionally accepted, China Quarterly
What are the consequences of nationalist unrest? This paper utilizes original datasets of 377 city-level anti-Japanese protests during the 2012 Senkaku/Diaoyu Island crisis and of the careers of municipal leaders to analyze the downstream effects of nationalist unrest at the subnational level. We find both political and economic consequences of China’s 2012 protest demonstrations against Japan. Specifically, top party leaders in cities that saw relatively spontaneous, early protests were less likely to be promoted to higher office, consistent with the widely-held but rarely tested expectation that social instability is punished in the Chinese Communist Party’s cadre evaluation system. We also find a negative effect of nationalist protest on FDI growth at the city level. However, the lower promotion rates associated with relatively spontaneous protests seem to have arisen through political rather than economic channels. By taking into account data on social unrest in addition to economic performance, these results add to existing evidence that systematic evaluation of leaders’ performance plays a major role in the Chinese political system. These findings also illuminate the dilemma that local leaders face in managing popular nationalism amid shifting national priorities.
Authoritarian Audiences and Government Rhetoric in International Crises: Evidence from China (with Allan Dafoe) revise and resubmit
We investigate how citizens in an authoritarian setting respond to hollow threats and elite justifications for restraint. We utilize two scenario-based survey experiments--one hypothetical and one that selectively reminds respondents of recent events--to evaluate how elite statements affect Chinese citizens' approval of their government's performance in its territorial and maritime disputes. We find evidence that citizens disapprove more of inaction after explicit threats to use force, providing evidence of mass "audience costs" in an authoritarian setting. We also find that citizens approve more after leaders bluster, suggesting a benefit to talking tough even in the absence of tough action. In addition, statements that invoke future success to justify present restraint increase approval. Together, these results indicate that audience costs exist in autocracies but can be muted or manipulated by elite statements, paralleling what scholars have found in the democratic context. We reflect on other mechanisms that may differentiate mass reactions to crisis developments in authoritarian and democratic regimes.
External Influence on Exchange Rates: An Empirical Investigation of US Pressure and the Chinese RMB (with Amber Wichowsky) revise and resubmit
Trade imbalances have often led to accusations of “currency manipulation” and efforts to remedy the purported effects of exchange rate misalignment. This paper investigates the impact of US pressure on China to revalue the RMB. Using vector autoregression (VAR) to analyze an original dataset of US statements and actions between 2005 and 2012, we examine the over-time dynamics between US pressure and the nominal RMB/USD exchange rate. A case study of mounting US pressure in advance of the 2010 midterm election illustrates China’s responsiveness in timing adjustments in the RMB to defuse the risk of an international confrontation. Our findings indicate that external political pressures can influence national exchange rate policies under certain conditions.
Provocation, Public Opinion, and Crisis Escalation: Evidence from China (with Allan Dafoe) under review
Crises frequently escalate from provocations--materially insignificant actions or incidents that stimulate resolve to defend the nation and retaliate against perceived transgressions. Leaders often invoke the language of provocation to explain why their public demands restitution and tough action. Are they bluffing? We theorize that foreign provocative actions--such as insults, non-militarized escalation, fatalities, and symbolic shows of force--can increase public disapproval of the government for not taking strong countermeasures. We employ two kinds of scenario-based survey experiments--the first involving a hypothetical scenario, the second involving the selective presentation of historical events--to evaluate how provocative events affect Chinese citizens' resolve and approval of their government's foreign policy performance. We also exploit a natural experiment by deploying these surveys during the days surrounding US military patrols in the South China Sea. We find evidence consistent with our theory. Citizens disapprove of government inaction in the face of provocative actions, potentially tying the government's hands by creating incentives to escalate international crises. The phenomenon of provocation reduces the efficacy of coercive tactics and alters bargaining dynamics.
Campaign Rhetoric and Chinese Reactions to New Leaders (with Kacie Miura) under review
How does campaign rhetoric shape foreign perceptions and reactions to the election of new leaders? Two primary factors guide Chinese beliefs and behavior toward new leaders in the United States, Japan, and Taiwan. First is the degree of consistency between campaign rhetoric and other indicators of a candidate’s likely policy toward China; second is the degree of change from the policies of the past administration. China adopts a wait-and-see approach toward leaders whose campaign rhetoric is inconsistent; a proactive approach toward leaders whose campaign rhetoric is consistent with indicators of change in either a hawkish or dovish direction; and a status quo orientation toward leaders whose campaign rhetoric is consistent with continuity in China policy. China does not probe or test the resolve of new leaders, nor does it dismiss campaign remarks outright or mistake them for policy, contrary to common assumptions about how authoritarian states understand democratic leadership transitions.
More than Cheap Talk: U.S. Campaign Rhetoric and Congressional Activity on China (with Amber Wichowsky)
Is China-bashing on the campaign trail more than just "cheap talk"? If campaign appeals are reliable indicators of future legislative activity, then democratic signals may be less noisy than cynics complain, adding micro-level evidence of democratic credibility in international politics. While not the intended audience of campaign ads, Chinese policymakers may overhear and draw inferences about U.S. policy. We show that when challengers attacked on the campaign trail during the 2010 midterm elections, successful challengers and victorious incumbents were subsequently more likely to sponsor anti-China legislation.
Diversionary Gambles and Nationalist Protests in International Crisis Bargaining (with Alexandre Debs)
We investigate the conditions under which diversionary war can result from the strategic interaction of rational governments and investigate the effect of nationalist protests on international crisis bargaining. We illustrate our results with two case studies, the Falklands War of 1982 and the recent tensions between China and Japan in the East China Sea.
What are the consequences of nationalist unrest? This paper utilizes original datasets of 377 city-level anti-Japanese protests during the 2012 Senkaku/Diaoyu Island crisis and of the careers of municipal leaders to analyze the downstream effects of nationalist unrest at the subnational level. We find both political and economic consequences of China’s 2012 protest demonstrations against Japan. Specifically, top party leaders in cities that saw relatively spontaneous, early protests were less likely to be promoted to higher office, consistent with the widely-held but rarely tested expectation that social instability is punished in the Chinese Communist Party’s cadre evaluation system. We also find a negative effect of nationalist protest on FDI growth at the city level. However, the lower promotion rates associated with relatively spontaneous protests seem to have arisen through political rather than economic channels. By taking into account data on social unrest in addition to economic performance, these results add to existing evidence that systematic evaluation of leaders’ performance plays a major role in the Chinese political system. These findings also illuminate the dilemma that local leaders face in managing popular nationalism amid shifting national priorities.
Authoritarian Audiences and Government Rhetoric in International Crises: Evidence from China (with Allan Dafoe) revise and resubmit
We investigate how citizens in an authoritarian setting respond to hollow threats and elite justifications for restraint. We utilize two scenario-based survey experiments--one hypothetical and one that selectively reminds respondents of recent events--to evaluate how elite statements affect Chinese citizens' approval of their government's performance in its territorial and maritime disputes. We find evidence that citizens disapprove more of inaction after explicit threats to use force, providing evidence of mass "audience costs" in an authoritarian setting. We also find that citizens approve more after leaders bluster, suggesting a benefit to talking tough even in the absence of tough action. In addition, statements that invoke future success to justify present restraint increase approval. Together, these results indicate that audience costs exist in autocracies but can be muted or manipulated by elite statements, paralleling what scholars have found in the democratic context. We reflect on other mechanisms that may differentiate mass reactions to crisis developments in authoritarian and democratic regimes.
External Influence on Exchange Rates: An Empirical Investigation of US Pressure and the Chinese RMB (with Amber Wichowsky) revise and resubmit
Trade imbalances have often led to accusations of “currency manipulation” and efforts to remedy the purported effects of exchange rate misalignment. This paper investigates the impact of US pressure on China to revalue the RMB. Using vector autoregression (VAR) to analyze an original dataset of US statements and actions between 2005 and 2012, we examine the over-time dynamics between US pressure and the nominal RMB/USD exchange rate. A case study of mounting US pressure in advance of the 2010 midterm election illustrates China’s responsiveness in timing adjustments in the RMB to defuse the risk of an international confrontation. Our findings indicate that external political pressures can influence national exchange rate policies under certain conditions.
Provocation, Public Opinion, and Crisis Escalation: Evidence from China (with Allan Dafoe) under review
Crises frequently escalate from provocations--materially insignificant actions or incidents that stimulate resolve to defend the nation and retaliate against perceived transgressions. Leaders often invoke the language of provocation to explain why their public demands restitution and tough action. Are they bluffing? We theorize that foreign provocative actions--such as insults, non-militarized escalation, fatalities, and symbolic shows of force--can increase public disapproval of the government for not taking strong countermeasures. We employ two kinds of scenario-based survey experiments--the first involving a hypothetical scenario, the second involving the selective presentation of historical events--to evaluate how provocative events affect Chinese citizens' resolve and approval of their government's foreign policy performance. We also exploit a natural experiment by deploying these surveys during the days surrounding US military patrols in the South China Sea. We find evidence consistent with our theory. Citizens disapprove of government inaction in the face of provocative actions, potentially tying the government's hands by creating incentives to escalate international crises. The phenomenon of provocation reduces the efficacy of coercive tactics and alters bargaining dynamics.
Campaign Rhetoric and Chinese Reactions to New Leaders (with Kacie Miura) under review
How does campaign rhetoric shape foreign perceptions and reactions to the election of new leaders? Two primary factors guide Chinese beliefs and behavior toward new leaders in the United States, Japan, and Taiwan. First is the degree of consistency between campaign rhetoric and other indicators of a candidate’s likely policy toward China; second is the degree of change from the policies of the past administration. China adopts a wait-and-see approach toward leaders whose campaign rhetoric is inconsistent; a proactive approach toward leaders whose campaign rhetoric is consistent with indicators of change in either a hawkish or dovish direction; and a status quo orientation toward leaders whose campaign rhetoric is consistent with continuity in China policy. China does not probe or test the resolve of new leaders, nor does it dismiss campaign remarks outright or mistake them for policy, contrary to common assumptions about how authoritarian states understand democratic leadership transitions.
More than Cheap Talk: U.S. Campaign Rhetoric and Congressional Activity on China (with Amber Wichowsky)
Is China-bashing on the campaign trail more than just "cheap talk"? If campaign appeals are reliable indicators of future legislative activity, then democratic signals may be less noisy than cynics complain, adding micro-level evidence of democratic credibility in international politics. While not the intended audience of campaign ads, Chinese policymakers may overhear and draw inferences about U.S. policy. We show that when challengers attacked on the campaign trail during the 2010 midterm elections, successful challengers and victorious incumbents were subsequently more likely to sponsor anti-China legislation.
Diversionary Gambles and Nationalist Protests in International Crisis Bargaining (with Alexandre Debs)
We investigate the conditions under which diversionary war can result from the strategic interaction of rational governments and investigate the effect of nationalist protests on international crisis bargaining. We illustrate our results with two case studies, the Falklands War of 1982 and the recent tensions between China and Japan in the East China Sea.
