

Supplementary Files (Online Appendix)

Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China

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A Supplementary Analyses

A.1 Variables and Summary Statistics

asc: Approval Measure, Post

asc0: Approval Measure, Pre

his, pro, ADIZ, ADIZp, eli.f, eli.c: Selective-History treatment indicators for: conditions history, provocation, vague threat, vague threat with defiance, bidding time, and cost of war. These were all assigned independently of each other, except that vague threat with defiance only occurs if vague threat occurs, and only one of eli.f and eli.c could occur.

his, pro, prot, com, mob, eli.f, eli.c: Hypothetical treatment indicators for history, provocation, protests, commitments, troop mobilization, bidding time, cost of war. These were all assigned independently of each other, except that only one of eli.f and eli.c could occur.

authoritarian, ally, capabilities, salience: Hypothetical treatment indicators for background conditions authoritarian regime, ally with US, adversary has strong military, whether loss would hurt safety and economy of China. These were assigned independently of each other, and of all other manipulations.

pre.questions: indicator for whether pre-scenario questions were asked

asc.or: indicator for order of answer options for question asc

partner: indicator for which Qualtrics partner provided the respondent

na1: respondent answer to question na1, which asks about national honor

na2: respondent answer to question na2, which asks about reliance on China's military strength

na3: respondent answer to question na3, which asks about political views (conservative vs liberal)

na2.v.dn: indicator for whether respondent answered "don't know" or "refused to answer"

na3.v.dn: indicator for whether respondent answered "don't know" or "refused to answer"

gender: indicator for reported gender, 1 for female¹

educ: variable for education. Levels are: 01 No formal education; 02 Elementary school; 03 Middle school 04 High school; 05 College; 06 Masters; 07 Doctoral

age: variable for age

.o or .v: denotes the variable in its original form, before missing values were imputed

.v2: denotes the version of the variable in which missing values were imputed as a single central value, usually median or mode, for analysis

.m: denotes an indicator variable for whether this variable was missing because the respondent skipped the question

start.time.n,.n2.n3: denotes the variables time, time squared, and time cubed which record when the respondent began the survey. These variables are meant to account for potential changes in the international political context that might have occurred over the period of time in which the survey was in the field.

start.time.swd: denotes the second wave of the survey. This variable is meant to account for potential changes in the international political context that might have occurred between the first and second waves of the survey.

¹For replication purposes, all demographic information has been replaced with a random sample of demographics similar in distribution with those from the original data.


Table A.1: Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
asc	2,992	2.985	1.101	1	5
asc0	2,345	3.835	0.873	1	5
his	3,241	0.467	0.499	0	1
pro	3,241	0.226	0.419	0	1
prot	3,241	0.118	0.323	0	1
com	3,241	0.223	0.416	0	1
mob	3,241	0.222	0.416	0	1
eli.f	3,241	0.069	0.253	0	1
eli.c	3,241	0.068	0.253	0	1
authoritarian	3,241	0.466	0.499	0	1
ally	3,241	0.465	0.499	0	1
capabilities	3,241	0.464	0.499	0	1
salience	3,241	0.466	0.499	0	1
pre.questions	3,241	0.712	0.453	0	1
asc.or	2,992	0.500	0.500	0	1
na1.v	2,308	8.012	1.974	0	10
na2.v	2,308	2.438	0.639	1	3
na3.v	2,308	3.229	0.916	1	5
na2.v.dn	3,241	0.044	0.206	0	1
na3.v.dn	3,241	0.021	0.143	0	1
gender.o	2,019	0.353	0.478	0	1
educ.o	2,019	4.960	0.576	1	7
age.o	2,019	35.872	10.157	6	85
age.m	3,241	0.377	0.485	0	1
gender.m	3,241	0.377	0.485	0	1
educ.m	3,241	0.377	0.485	0	1

Table A.2: Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
asc	5,445	3.405	1.076	1	5
asc0	4,927	3.890	0.917	1	5
his	5,950	0.219	0.413	0	1
pro	5,950	0.211	0.408	0	1
ADIZ	5,950	0.427	0.495	0	1
ADIZp	5,950	0.215	0.411	0	1
eli.f	5,950	0.071	0.257	0	1
eli.c	5,950	0.067	0.251	0	1
asc.or	5,445	0.500	0.500	0	1
na1.v	4,791	7.698	2.275	0	10
na2.v	4,791	2.374	0.661	1	3
na3.v	4,791	3.143	0.958	1	5
na2.v.dn	5,950	0.065	0.247	0	1
na3.v.dn	5,950	0.032	0.176	0	1
gender.o	3,535	0.374	0.484	0	1
educ.o	3,531	4.941	0.606	1	7
age.o	3,535	34.331	10.166	11	85
age.m	5,950	0.406	0.491	0	1
gender.m	5,950	0.406	0.491	0	1
educ.m	5,950	0.407	0.491	0	1

Figure A.1: Raw Results Selective History



Note: Estimated effect of government rhetoric treatments on public approval of the government's actions relative to the control group, similar to Figures 1 and 2 in the main text. This estimation includes only the treatment and no other covariates.


A.2 Raw Results

Figures A.1 and A.2 report the bivariate estimates of the treatment effects on government approval. Similar to the results discussed in Figure 1 and 2 in the main text, in the selective history design, Biding Time, Nationalist History, Cost of War and Vague Threat treatments increased approval. Similarly, in the hypothetical design, the Biding Treatment, Nationalist History and Cost of War treatment increased approval, while the Explicit Threat treatment decreased approval. Overall, the raw estimates are similar in size and direction with the estimated coefficients in the main text.

Figures A.5 and A.6 report the mean approval level of the treatment group relative to the control for each treatment type.


Tables A.3 and A.4 report the effect of being asked questions about national honour, alongside questions related to the reliance on China's military strength or the respondent's political views. One worry may be that these questions act as a pre-treatment prime that inflates hawkishness across the sample. Respondents were randomly asked these questions within the first few weeks of the survey, with all respondents being asked these questions after this period. Tables A.3 and A.4 report the effect of these pretreatment questions among those

Figure A.2: Raw Results Hypothetical Design



Note: Estimated effect of government rhetoric treatments on public approval of the government's actions relative to the control group, similar to Figures 1 and 2 in the main text. This estimation includes only the treatment and no other covariates.

Figure A.3: Government Approval by Treatment (Selective History)



Note: Percentage distribution of government rhetoric treatments on government approval relative to the control group in the selective history design.

who were randomly asked these questions. In the case of the real history design, a decrease in approval is noticeable. However, given that the pretreatment questions included a battery of questions, it remains unclear whether the effect is necessarily dragged by any particular question, such as the national honour one. In the hypothetical design case, pretreatment questions had no effect on approval.

Table A.3: Prequestions Effect on Approval (Real History)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Approval
pre.questions	-0.193*** (0.052)
Constant	3.576*** (0.041)
Observations	1,843


Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.4: Prequestions Effect on Approval (Hypothetical Design)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Approval
Prequestions	-0.062 (0.058)
Constant	3.034*** (0.041)
Observations	1,494
R ²	0.001


Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure A.4: Government Approval by Treatment (Hypothetical Design)




Note: Percentage distribution of government rhetoric treatments on government approval relative to the control group in the hypothetical design.

Figure A.5: Government Approval by Treatment (Selective History)



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The Figure plots the mean approval level of the treatment and control status for each treatment type. History refers to the National History treatment, VT denotes the Vague Threat treatment, Biding denotes the Biding Time treatment and Cost of War denotes the Cost of War treatment.

Figure A.6: Government Approval by Treatment (Hypothetical Design)



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The Figure plots the mean approval level of the treatment and control status for each treatment type. History refers to the National History treatment, Commit denotes the Explicit Threat treatment, Mobilize denotes the Mobilization treatment, Biding denotes the Biding Time treatment and Cost of War denotes the Cost of War treatment.

A.3 Primary Regression Tables

Table A.5: Effect on Approval, Hypothetical

<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	asc	
	(1)	(2)
pro	-0.090 [†] (0.047)	-0.108* (0.045)
prot	-0.029 (0.060)	-0.045 (0.057)
com	-0.069 (0.047)	-0.056 (0.045)
mob	0.008 (0.047)	0.053 (0.045)
eli.f	0.120 (0.077)	0.093 (0.073)
eli.c	0.040 (0.077)	0.026 (0.073)
authoritarian	-0.018 (0.040)	-0.026 (0.038)
ally	-0.006 (0.040)	-0.012 (0.038)
capabilities	-0.020 (0.040)	-0.021 (0.038)
saliency	0.002 (0.040)	0.009 (0.038)
his	0.043 (0.040)	0.030 (0.038)
pre.questions	-0.042 (0.047)	-0.107 [†] (0.057)
asc.or	0.235*** (0.040)	0.226*** (0.038)
partnerB		-0.126* (0.057)
asc0.v2		0.339*** (0.027)
na1.v2		-0.042*** (0.012)
na2.v2		-0.202*** (0.035)
na3.v2		0.023 (0.024)
na2.v.dn		-0.040 (0.101)
na3.v.dn		-0.179 (0.144)
gender		0.072 (0.049)
educ		-0.100* (0.040)
age		-0.006** (0.002)
age.m		0.131 (0.097)
gender.m		
educ.m		
start.time.n		0.00000 (0.00000)
start.time.n2		0.000 (0.000)
start.time.n3		-0.000 [†] (0.000)
start.time.swd		
Constant	2.928*** (0.068)	2.982*** (0.292)
Observations	2,992	2,992
R ²	0.015	0.123
Adjusted R ²	0.011	0.115
Residual Std. Error	1.095 (df = 2978)	1.036 (df = 2964)
F Statistic	3.584*** (df = 13; 2978)	15.459*** (df = 27; 2964)

Note:

[†] $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.6: Effect on Approval, History

<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
asc		
	(1)	(2)
pre.questions	-0.188*** (0.043)	-0.168*** (0.050)
asc.or	0.308*** (0.029)	0.305*** (0.026)
asc0.v2		0.536*** (0.016)
na1.v2		-0.017** (0.006)
na2.v2		-0.082*** (0.022)
na3.v2		0.013 (0.015)
na2.v.dn		0.042 (0.057)
na3.v.dn		-0.039 (0.079)
gender		-0.037 (0.034)
educ		0.041 (0.027)
age		0.003 (0.002)
age.m		0.137 (0.480)
gender.m		
educ.m		0.074 (0.483)
start.time.n		0.000 (0.00000)
start.time.n2		-0.000 (0.000)
start.time.n3		0.000 (0.000)
start.time.swd		0.085 (0.122)
his	0.069* (0.034)	0.072* (0.031)
pro	-0.056 (0.035)	-0.054 [†] (0.031)
ADIZ	0.051 (0.036)	0.066* (0.033)
ADIZp	-0.035 (0.042)	-0.049 (0.038)
eli.f	0.060 (0.054)	0.088 [†] (0.049)
eli.c	0.014 (0.055)	0.020 (0.050)
partnerB		-0.054 (0.050)
Constant	3.390*** (0.046)	1.258*** (0.192)
Observations	5,445	5,445
R ²	0.026	0.213
Adjusted R ²	0.025	0.210
Residual Std. Error	1.063 (df = 5436)	0.957 (df = 5420)
F Statistic	18.129*** (df = 8; 5436)	61.140*** (df = 24; 5420)

Note:[†] $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

A.4 Attentiveness

As mentioned, 35% of our subjects failed at least one of our attention filters.² This level of attentiveness appears comparable to what is achieved in other survey samples and in other countries (though, in our experience, not MTurk where respondents are often especially attentive). For example, Berinsky et al (2014) found that 20% to 40% of their SSI sample failed their various attention filters (or "screeners") (?). We reflect here on what this might mean for our inference, though see Berinsky et al (2014) for a more extended discussion.

Respondents who are not attentive will generally be less responsive to experimental manipulation. As such, the first order effect of inattentiveness is to make it harder to generate effects in an experiment. Whether this leads to bias or not depends on one's population of interest and causal estimand. For example, if one's target real-world context and counterfactual involves people who are similarly inattentive to real-world events, then this inattentiveness is actually a desired feature of the population. Alternatively, we might think that in the target real-world context (1) people would be paying more attention or (2) only those people who are paying attention would be politically relevant, in which case our estimand is not what our survey experiment will estimate, and we may want to theorize about or adjust for the difference between these. If our desired population consists of the kinds of people who would pay attention in the survey, then our estimates should be less biased after subsetting on those who pass an attention filter.

Suppose that actual attentiveness in the survey is not correlated with the unit level causal effects for an attentive subject.³ Then the primary issue becomes whether including, excluding, or otherwise adjusting for attentive subjects will increase statistical power. Excluding inattentive subjects could increase power, such as if the inattentive subjects are providing more noise than signal. At the limit, if some subjects are answering randomly (and we can identify them pre-treatment) then it must be better to drop those uninformative observations. Alternatively, removing inattentive subjects could reduce power, if their responses are still providing sufficient signal.

While the above considerations are important to keep in mind, we don't believe they pose a substantial concern to our inference, relative to what should be expected from this kind of research. (1) Our inference does not rely on closely recovering a target population, as we are primarily looking for the existence of effects for a sample approximately corresponding to a politically relevant population. (2) Survey experiments, in general, face the challenge of trying to recover a real-world counterfactual using vignettes that are likely to lack realism

²The first read: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The current population of China is more than five billion? (This is an attention filter. Please select disagree. The true population of China is in fact 1.4 billion)." The second read: "Now we would like to ask about your views on China's geography and population. First, we will ask you a question to see if you are paying attention. Please choose the number twenty-two below."

³That is, take a group of subjects who pass the attention filter, and a group who do not. If they were forced to be attentive, perhaps by exposing them to the real world treatment, then this assumption would imply that the average causal effects for these two groups will be the same.

in many dimensions. Our vignettes strived for realism in many respects, especially the selective-history design, and thus relative to the standards for this method, are less likely to suffer from problems of external validity. In other research we have also complemented the hypothetical and selective-history design with a natural experiment, which recovered similar results.

An additional complication with subsetting on inattentiveness arises with our design because we (intentionally) asked our attention filters late in the survey. In this case, our measure of attentiveness could be a consequence of treatment received. For example, if one of our experimental manipulations was especially interesting then more subjects receiving that manipulation should pass our attention filter. In such a case, it is problematic to subset or adjust on our attention measure, since it could be a consequence of treatment. If considering doing so, one must be cautious in interpreting the result.

In our case, as per our preanalysis plan and for the above reasons, our primary analysis leaves the inattentive subjects in the sample. However, for transparency we report below (1) the results after removing inattentive subjects and (2) results from a model predicting attentiveness using our experimental manipulations.

(1) Removing inattentive subjects does not meaningfully change our results. Compare Tables 3 and 4 with Tables 5 and 6. With respect to the hypothetical design, once the inattentive respondents are omitted the estimated effect of Biding Time increases in magnitude and, when controlling for pre-treatment covariates, becomes statistically significant at the .1 level. For the selective history design the estimated effects of interest (biding time and nationalist history treatments) remain statistically significant and increase in magnitude slightly.

(2) Tables 7 and 8 reveal that overall our experimental manipulations do not cause inattentiveness. The F-test of the null that any of the experimental manipulations had an effect on attentiveness yielded a $p = 0.6$ for the selective history design (Table 8), showing that there is little reason to think in this case that the experimental manipulations had an effect. The F-test for the hypothetical design would have been similar, but for one result: Mobilization significantly $p < 0.01$ increased attentiveness.⁴ This suggests that scenarios involving troop mobilization were more engaging. One way this could affect our inference is if we get slightly more signal from the Mobilization treatment; in our case given that Mobilization did not have a clearly positive or negative effect, plausibly because of countervailing effects, an amplification of attention did not alter our results. Future work could continue to consider, as we have done here, how attentiveness may be influenced by treatment assignment, as it may provide insight into the mechanism of the effect.

⁴More weakly, in the hypothetical design Nationalist History and whether a subject got a set of questions before the vignette had a weaker and barely significant ($p < 0.1$) reduction in attentiveness, and in the selective history design the Explicit Threat had a similarly weak positive effect on attentiveness. Given multiple comparisons bias we should not overinterpret these weak results.

Table A.7: Effect on Approval, Hypothetical (Inattentive respondents omitted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	asc	
	(1)	(2)
pro	-0.080 (0.060)	-0.119* (0.058)
prot	0.015 (0.077)	-0.021 (0.074)
com	-0.053 (0.060)	-0.060 (0.057)
mob	-0.009 (0.059)	0.021 (0.057)
eli.f	0.169 (0.103)	0.186 [†] (0.099)
eli.c	0.068 (0.101)	0.063 (0.097)
authoritarian	-0.022 (0.051)	-0.022 (0.049)
ally	-0.054 (0.051)	-0.054 (0.049)
capabilities	-0.055 (0.051)	-0.063 (0.049)
saliency	0.019 (0.051)	0.028 (0.049)
his	0.053 (0.051)	0.040 (0.049)
pre.questions	-0.062 (0.059)	-0.120 (0.073)
asc.or	0.164** (0.051)	0.146** (0.049)
partnerB		-0.124 [†] (0.074)
asc0.v2		0.334*** (0.035)
na1.v2		-0.061*** (0.016)
na2.v2		-0.267*** (0.048)
na3.v2		0.042 (0.032)
na2.v.dn		-0.028 (0.144)
na3.v.dn		-0.127 (0.230)
gender		0.081 (0.053)
educ		-0.079 [†] (0.043)
age		-0.006* (0.003)
age.m		-0.157 (0.193)
gender.m		
educ.m		
start.time.n		0.00000 (0.00000)
start.time.n2		0.000 (0.000)
start.time.n3		-0.000* (0.000)
start.time.swd		
Constant	2.850*** (0.086)	3.194*** (0.344)
Observations	1,896	1,896
R ²	0.011	0.096
Adjusted R ²	0.004	0.083
Residual Std. Error	1.111 (df = 1882)	1.067 (df = 1868)
F Statistic	1.623 [†] (df = 13; 1882)	7.347*** (df = 27; 1868)

Note:

[†] $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.8: Effect on Approval, History (Inattentive respondents omitted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	asc	
	(1)	(2)
pre.questions	-0.210*** (0.055)	-0.180** (0.061)
asc.or	0.263*** (0.037)	0.255*** (0.033)
asc0.v2		0.592*** (0.019)
na1.v2		-0.022** (0.008)
na2.v2		-0.089** (0.028)
na3.v2		0.003 (0.019)
na2.v.dn		0.030 (0.080)
na3.v.dn		-0.036 (0.120)
gender		-0.053 (0.035)
educ		0.039 (0.028)
age		0.003† (0.002)
age.m		0.088 (0.484)
gender.m		
educ.m		0.093 (0.482)
start.time.n		0.00000 (0.00000)
start.time.n2		-0.000 (0.000)
start.time.n3		0.000 (0.000)
start.time.swd		0.084 (0.153)
his	0.101* (0.044)	0.095* (0.039)
pro	-0.052 (0.044)	-0.057 (0.039)
ADIZ	0.032 (0.046)	0.037 (0.041)
ADIZp	-0.049 (0.054)	-0.075 (0.047)
eli.f	0.041 (0.070)	0.107† (0.062)
eli.c	-0.021 (0.072)	-0.002 (0.063)
partnerB		-0.092 (0.063)
Constant	3.404*** (0.059)	1.171*** (0.215)
Observations	3,429	3,429
R ²	0.021	0.245
Adjusted R ²	0.019	0.240
Residual Std. Error	1.083 (df = 3420)	0.953 (df = 3404)
F Statistic	9.360*** (df = 8; 3420)	46.095*** (df = 24; 3404)

Note:

† $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.9: Effect on Attentiveness, Hypothetical

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	att
pro	0.005 (0.020)
prot	0.008 (0.026)
com	0.032 (0.020)
mob	0.059** (0.020)
eli.f	-0.049 (0.033)
eli.c	-0.042 (0.033)
authoritarian	-0.007 (0.017)
ally	0.010 (0.017)
capabilities	-0.002 (0.017)
saliency	-0.0001 (0.017)
his	-0.029 [†] (0.017)
pre.questions	-0.033 [†] (0.020)
asc.or	0.0002 (0.017)
Constant	0.709*** (0.029)
Observations	2,992
R ²	0.008
Adjusted R ²	0.003
Residual Std. Error	0.463 (df = 2978)
F Statistic	1.790* (df = 13; 2978)

Note: [†] $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.10: Effect on Attentiveness, History

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	att
pre.questions	-0.007 (0.019)
asc.or	-0.012 (0.013)
his	-0.008 (0.015)
pro	0.006 (0.015)
ADIZ	0.027 [†] (0.016)
ADIZp	-0.001 (0.019)
eli.f	-0.017 (0.024)
eli.c	-0.013 (0.024)
Constant	0.685*** (0.020)
Observations	5,445
R ²	0.001
Adjusted R ²	-0.0003
Residual Std. Error	0.466 (df = 5436)
F Statistic	0.811 (df = 8; 5436)

Note: [†] $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

A.5 Attenuated Effects: Self-Censorship?

Overall, our experimental manipulations did not generate effects as large as those found in studies of audience costs fielded to US and British samples. A potential explanation is self-censorship.⁵ A concern with all surveys is whether respondents' answers correspond with their sincere beliefs, especially in an authoritarian context where the government can punish the expression of certain political views. In designing our surveys, we sought to minimize the risks to our respondents while preserving the core scientific value of the research in three ways. First, we did not ask questions that could uniquely identify respondents, such as their name, email address, or other personally identifying questions. Second, our survey was hosted by Qualtrics, a reputable non-Chinese firm with strict security policies.⁶ Third, our questions tried to solicit the types of opinions that Chinese citizens regularly voice on social media and do not fall very far outside the bounds of questions asked in other Chinese surveys.⁷ As King, Pan, and Roberts have demonstrated, it is not criticism of the government per se but commentary that could facilitate collective action that Chinese authorities typically censor (?). Nevertheless, given the Chinese government's advanced cyber capabilities and potential sanctions against disaffected citizens, some respondents may have shielded or falsified their true beliefs (?). Some respondents may also be part of the "fifty-cent party (*wumao dang*)" in China, individuals who volunteer or are paid or obliged to post positive comments and engage in online "cheerleading" (?).

To assess the degree to which self-censorship or fifty-cent cheerleading might be affecting our results, we look at several variables. First, we look at whether our respondents offered answers that might be aimed at pleasing their government. If this were the case, we would expect to see nearly universal high approval of the government. Our data do not show this. The majority of respondents do not choose *Strongly Approve*, the median response is

⁵Another potential explanation is low attentiveness in our sample. Approximately 35% failed our two easy attention filters. However, this rate is comparable to that reported in other surveys, such as (?) two SSI samples. We discuss and evaluate attentiveness in more detail in Appendix A.4

⁶Their *Security White Paper Lite* can be found [here](#); their full *Security White Paper* is available from Qualtrics after signing a confidentiality agreement. For our purposes, it is worth noting that Qualtrics appears to employ best practices in protecting data and that their Asia/Pacific Servers are located in Sydney, Australia.

⁷For example, the Chinese General Social Survey asks whether respondents have "ever attended self-motivated patriotic protest (including activities such as boycotting Japanese goods)", and the TAMU China Survey asks whether respondents have ever "signed a petition", "taken part in a demonstration", or "joined an organization or group in support of a political cause". The TAMU survey also asks whether respondents agree with the statement "the state is too strong" and "there is not enough freedom", how satisfied respondents are with the central government, how respondents communicate with others about political issues, as well as whether respondents have "personally experienced or witnessed a situation of cadre corruption".

<http://thechinasurvey.tamu.edu/html/home.html>.

Approve, and about 33% of respondents did not *Approve* or *Strongly Approve* (see Appendix B.1). Second, we might think that respondents who are guarding their beliefs would not disapprove more of their government after specific scenarios, such as our Explicit Threat condition, as they might suppress negative judgments on the government as a function of adverse events. This is also contrary to what we find. Third, we would expect to see high levels of agreement with the question *cc*: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Criticism of government policy is unhelpful.” We did not see high levels of agreement with this statement. As figure B.3 shows, as many respondents disagreed as agreed with it.

Although self-censorship or fifty-cent cheerleading does not appear to dominate our data, it may still be heavily influencing our results, attenuating our effects if respondents are more likely to agree with the government or avoid judging the government’s performance. After individually examining and hand-coding the open-ended responses, we found that approximately 13% of respondents expressed a wish to defer to the government’s judgment. While this deference to the government will make it more difficult for our prompts to move respondent opinions, it may lead to more externally valid estimates, depending on how we think about our causal estimand. One class of estimands relates to the respondents’ *private beliefs*: what the respondent would say if they were completely honest. Estimates of private beliefs are more likely to be biased by respondent concerns of government punishment. Another class of estimands relates to *public beliefs*: what respondents would be willing to say in public, in conversations with friends, and online. Private beliefs could be of primary research interest if, for example, one wanted to evaluate how (expressed) public opinion could shift if there was a focal event that made people more willing to express different opinions. Public beliefs are in many ways of greater importance, since public beliefs—what people are willing to express in the current political environment—are what determine the acute benefits and costs to the Chinese government of foreign policy actions. Put differently, in order for domestic public opinion to “matter,” it needs to be expressed in some manner, and usually this is in a public manner. Thus, for evaluating these effects we believe a focus on public beliefs is productive: we want to know what respondents are willing to say in a venue like an online survey. It is worth keeping in mind that all surveys are better able to estimate public beliefs than private beliefs.

A.6 Threats to Identification

One potential threat to identification may be that approval is increasing in the length of treatment text the respondents received, including treatments related to information or rhetoric, threats. The advantage of this hypothesis is that it is partially testable with our data. We can look to see whether approval is generally increasing in text length.

Broadly, our data suggests this effect either doesn’t exist or is relatively small, as evident from Table A.5. We had a range of potential treatments, including background treatments which seem to fit this hypothesis of involving additional information, and they did not systematically increase approval. For example, receiving either of the independently assigned conditions of authoritarian regime, ally with the US, capabilities or salience had no effect on approval among respondents. These treatments each increased the length of treatment text that respondents received. Thus, the small or absence of effects here is evidence that length

of text did not have large effects on approval. Of course, it remains possible that particular forms of this confound could impact results.

B Descriptive Results

This section contains more complete results from the above reported analyses.

B.1 Approval

The first question asked of respondents was the following:

Hypothetical: How do you feel about the government's performance in handling China's international affairs?

Selective-History: Regarding the security situation in China's surrounding waters, what is your overall evaluation of the government's performance?




Figure B.1: Distribution of government approval by experiment (pre-scenario).




Figure B.2: Distribution of government approval by experiment (post-scenario).

Criticism of the Government is Unhelpful




Figure B.3: Distribution of respondent perceptions of criticism of the government being unhelpful.

C Demographics and Recruitment

C.1 Recruitment Details

Subjects were recruited through Chinese partners of Qualtrics. The names of the partners were not publicly disclosed for proprietary reasons, though we were able to get information about how subjects were recruited. Broadly, Qualtrics’ partners recruited respondents through a variety of means, including “referrals, online intercept, and email invitations;” this document⁸ provides more information about their recruitment practices. According to our Qualtrics’ team lead, our sample was “sourced from an existing research panel”, “all our sample sources [were] paid” about \$1USD, and it is “unlikely that [our respondents] would have participated in a similar survey. Most other surveys are market research focused.”⁹ In response to the question, “Do panelists know anything about the contents of our survey (like even the topic) before they click on the link?” our team lead wrote “Respondents are not given insights into the content of a survey beforehand.”

C.2 Demographics

65% of our sample was male. 55% of Chinese Internet users are male, as reported by the China Internet Network Information Center.¹⁰

⁸<https://www.dropbox.com/s/epwhgs3yd2yr8fm/QualtricsESOMAR28.pdf?dl=0>

⁹“Panel Respondents are only invited to 2-3 surveys a month. They are not allowed to participate in more than 2 surveys a month. The average panelist only remains on the panel for approximately 6-8 weeks. So, it would be fair to say that a majority of the panel members would have completed 4 or fewer surveys prior to participating in your experiment.”

¹⁰36th Statistical Report on Internet Development in China (2015) available at <https://cnnic.com.cn/IDR/ReportDownloads/201601/P020160106496544403584.pdf>.






Figure C.1: Distribution of respondent ethnicity.

Figure C.2: Education Distribution Our vs Huang Data




Huang data come from Haifeng Huang (2015). International Knowledge and Domestic Evaluations in a Changing Society: The Case of China. *American Political Science Review*, 109, pp 613-634. doi:10.1017/S000305541500026X.

Figure C.3: Education Distribution of Chinese Internet Users




Educational attainment of Chinese internet users provided by the CNNIC 2015, which does not separate college and post-graduate education. See <https://cnnic.com.cn/IDR/ReportDownloads/201601/P020160106496544403584.pdf>

Figure C.4: Age Distribution for Chinese Internet Users




Age data for Chinese Internet Users is from CNNIC 2014. Age data for China is from the [UNSD Demographic Statistics](#).

Figure C.5: Chinese Reliance on Military Strength Our vs RCCC 2012 Sample




“RCCC 2012” shows the responses to question B3 of the [Public Opinion Survey of the China-U.S. Security Perceptions Project \(2012\)](#), a face-to-face and GPS-assisted multistage probability survey of urban Chinese, conducted by the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University.

Figure C.6: Chinese Reliance on Military Strength Our vs RCCC 2012 Sample Substantive Answer



These proportions are for the total number of responses that gave a substantive answer, excluding “Don’t Know” and “Refuse to Answer”. “RCCC 2012” shows the responses to question B3 of the Public Opinion Survey of the China-U.S. Security Perceptions Project (2012), a face-to-face and GPS-assisted multistage probability survey of urban Chinese, conducted by the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University.


Figure C.7: Reasons Given



Reputation (references to adverse future consequences, such as leading others to take advantage or be more aggressive or demanding); Honor (references to honor, prestige, greatness, respect, or international standing); Nationalism (references such as “I am Chinese” or “I love China/my homeland”); Resolve (calls for the government to show greater strength or countermeasures and/or criticism of weakness or inaction); Sovereignty (references to sovereignty, territorial integrity, or disputed control of physical territory or maritime space); Biding time (references to future action to recover territory, defeat the adversary, or obtain concessions); Peace/Force (references to the value of peace or warnings against the use of force); Domestic development (references to the importance of domestic development, economic growth, stability, or social welfare); National interests (references to the country’s national interests or security, without necessarily referencing territorial integrity or sovereignty); Deference (references to the government’s judgment, reasoning, or plans); Complexity (references to the respondents lack of understanding or the complexity of the situation).

Figure C.8: Distribution of Pre-Scenario Responses

Distribution of Pre-Scenario Responses



[na1] How important is it to defend the national honor even if it jeopardizes the stability of China's international environment?

[scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being not important at all, and 10 being very important]

[na2] In general, does China rely on military strength too much, too little or about the right amount to achieve its foreign policy goals?

01 Too much. 02 About right. 03 Too little




Figure C.9: Distribution of respondent region.

D Hypothetical Design

Treatments in the hypothetical experiment were assigned in the following manner:

- At the start of the survey, our software randomly generated 8 independent values between 0 and 99 (inclusive) for each respondent [rand1-rand8].
- Respondents receiving $\text{rand1} < 20$ did not receive any of our primary treatments (Explicit Threat, Mobilization, Provocation, Protests).
- To be assigned the Explicit Threat treatment, respondents must have drawn a value of rand1 greater than or equal to 20 and rand4 less than 30. (That is, of those who received any primary treatment, 30% were independently assigned to receive the Explicit Threat treatment.)
- To be assigned the Mobilization treatment, respondents must have drawn rand1 greater than or equal to 20 and rand5 less than 30. (That is, of those who received any primary treatment, 30% were independently assigned to receive this treatment.)
- To be assigned the Biding Time treatment, respondents must have drawn rand6 less than 15 and rand8 less than 50. To be assigned the Cost of War treatment, respondents must have drawn rand6 less than 15 and rand8 greater than or equal to 50. (That is, 15% of all respondents were independently assigned to one of either the Costs of War treatment or Biding Time treatment.)
- To be assigned the Provocation treatment, respondents must have drawn rand1 greater than 20 and rand2 less than 30. (That is, of those who received any primary treatment, 30% were independently assigned to receive the Provocation treatment.)
- To be assign the Protests treatment, respondents must have drawn rand1 greater than or equal to 20 and rand3 less than 15. (That is, of those who received any primary treatment, 15% were independently assigned to receive the Protests treatment.)
- The Nationalist History treatment as well as the features of the hypothetical neighboring country including regime type, alliance status with US, material value of the territory in question, and the neighbor’s military power were assigned in a fully factorial way such that each respondent had an equal probability of being assigned to any combination of hypothetical features and the Nationalist History treatment.
- Those that drew random numbers that do not meet any of the criteria above and who did not receive the nationalist treatment comprise the non-parametric control group.

We present the realized frequencies of respondents for the main treatment combinations in Table D.1.

Consent

This survey is about your views of foreign affairs and domestic issues. We will ask you some questions about these topics. This survey is part of an academic research project.

此次问卷调查旨在了解您对国际和国内事务的看法。我们会问您一些关于这方面的问题。本调查是一项学术研究课题的一部分。调查结果将只用于学术目的。

The survey should take approximately 15 minutes. As specified in your invitation to this survey, you will receive an incentive if you qualify for and fully complete this survey. Participation in this study is completely voluntary. You are free to decline to participate or to end participation at any time for any reason.

完成本次调查大约需要 15 分钟。如果您具有参加本次调查的资格并且完成了本此调查的全部问题，您会收到给您的邀请中所指定的数额的奖励。参加此次调查完全基于自愿。您可以拒绝参加本调查，或者在任何时候以任何方式停止回答问卷。

Your responses will be kept confidential. We will not ask for your name, email address, or other personal identification, and we will not share any of your personal information with others. If you have any questions about this study, please contact the investigators at: adk423@gmail.com

您个人的回答将会被保密。我们不会询问您的姓名、邮箱，或其他个人身份信息，我们也不会将您的个人信息分享给他人。如果您对本研究有任何问题，请联系：
adk423@gmail.com。

- I have read the above information and agree to participate in this study.
- I do not agree to participate.

我已经阅读了以上信息并同意参与此项调查
我不同意参加此项调查

[Pre-scenario questions]

We would first like your opinion on China's international affairs.

我们希望首先了解您对于中国国际事务的看法。

[as0] How do you feel about the government's performance in handling China's international affairs?

[randomize order]

- 01 Strongly disapprove
- 02 Disapprove
- 03 Neither approve nor disapprove
- 04 Approve
- 05 Strongly approve

[as0] 您对政府处理国际事务的表现做何整体评价？

- 01 强烈反对
- 02 反对
- 03 既不支持也不反对
- 04 支持
- 05 强烈支持

[na1] How important is it to defend the national honor even if it jeopardizes the stability of China's international environment?

[scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being not important at all, and 10 being very important]

[na1] 您认为捍卫国家荣誉的重要性有多大，即使这可能不利于中国获得稳定的国际环境？（0表示完全不重要，10表示极为重要）

[na2] In general, does China rely on military strength too much, too little or about the right amount to achieve its foreign policy goals?¹

- 01 Too much
- 02 Too little
- 03 About right
- 08 Don't know
- 09 Refuse to answer

[na2] 一般来看，您认为中国在实现外交目标方面过多地依赖军事力量、较少地依赖军事力量，还是不多不少地依赖军事力量？

¹ From Public Opinion Survey of the Sino-U.S. Security Perceptions (2012), Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University, question B3.

- 01 过多依赖
- 02 较少依赖
- 03 不多不少
- 08 不知道
- 09 拒绝回答

[na3] How would you describe your political views?²

- 01 very conservative
- 02 somewhat conservative
- 03 moderate
- 04 somewhat liberal
- 05 liberal
- 08 don't know
- 09 refuse to answer

[na3] 总的来说，您认为您的政治观点是非常保守的、比较保守的、温和的、比较开放的，还是非常开放的？

- 01 非常保守的
- 02 比较保守的
- 03 温和的
- 04 比较开放的
- 05 非常开放的
- 08 不知道
- 09 拒绝回答

[Scenario]

You will read about a situation that our country could face. We will describe one approach Chinese leaders might take and ask whether you approve or disapprove.

您将阅读一个中国可能面对的情形。我们将描述中国领导人可能采取的某项政策，并询问您是否支持该政策。

Imagine the following situation:

请想象以下情形：

There exists a territorial dispute between China and a neighboring country. The neighboring country is led by *[a non-democratic government OR a democratic government]*, *[is OR is not]* an

² This is from the Public Opinion Survey of the Sino-U.S. Security Perceptions (2012), Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University, question C6.

ally of the United States. The neighboring country has [*a strong military, so in the event of war it would* OR *a weak military, so in the event of war it would not*] take a major effort for China to secure control of the territory. Experts believe that allowing the neighboring country to control the territory [*would hurt* OR *would not affect*] the safety and economy of China. [The disputed territory was part of the land China lost during the Century of National Humiliation. OR no mention]

中国和某邻国之间对某一地区存在着主权争端。该邻国是一个【非民主国家/民主国家】，【是/不是】美国的盟国。该邻国拥有【较强的军事实力，因此如果发生战争，中国确保控制该地区需要付出较大的努力/较弱的军事实力，因此如果发生战争，中国控制该地区不需要付出较大的努力】。专家认为该国控制该地区【会/不会】影响中国的安全和经济。【争议地区是中国百年国耻期间沦丧的国土中的一部分。/不提及】

[Control]

[Provocation]

The neighboring country sends engineers to build infrastructure on the territory. When asked by a reporter if they were worried about China, the neighboring country's spokesman dismissed the possibility, saying that China is a paper tiger.

该邻国向该地区派出工程师以建造基础设施。当被记者问及是否担心中国介入时，该国政府发言人否认了这种可能，并表示中国是纸老虎。

[Protests]

A dozen Chinese protesters gather outside the neighboring country's embassy, calling for the defense of Chinese sovereignty over the territory.

十几名中国抗议者聚集在该邻国大使馆外，呼吁中国政府捍卫该地区的主权。

[Statement of Commitment]

The Chinese government states that the neighboring country must recognize Chinese sovereignty or China will use force to take the territory.

中国政府声明对该地区拥有主权，并表示该国必须承认中国的主权，否则中国将使用武力夺取该地区。

[Troop Mobilization]

China mobilizes military forces to prepare to take the territory by force.

中国进行军事动员，准备使用武力夺取该地区。

[Elite Cue - Framing]

Chinese officials explain that fighting a war over the territory would be a grave mistake. According to a senior Chinese military official, “China’s neighbors will use all means to check China’s development, but we absolutely must not take their bait.”

中国官员解释称开战将铸成大错。一位中国的高级军官表示：“中国的邻国千方百计要遏制中国发展，而我们千万不能上当。”

[Elite Cue – Cost of War]

Chinese officials explain that fighting a war over the territory would be too costly. According to a senior Chinese military official, “Since we have enjoyed peace for quite a long time, many young people do not know what a war is like, it is actually very cruel and costly. If there is any alternative way to solve the problem, there is no need to resort to the means of extreme violence for a solution.”

中国官员解释称开战的代价太大。一位中国的高级军官表示：“因为和平时间很长了，这么小的孩子不知道打仗是什么样，其实是很残酷的，代价很大的。可以用别的方式解决的情况下，没有必要用极端的暴力手段来解决。”

[Ending]

In the end, China does not take military action, and the neighboring country consolidates control over the territory.

最终，中国没有采取军事行动。该邻国加强了对争议地区的控制。

[Post-scenario questions]

Reflecting on this situation, we would like to ask you some questions.

在这样的情形下，我们希望向您询问一些问题。

[as1] How do you feel about the government’s performance in handling the situation?

[randomize order]

01 Strongly disapprove

02 Disapprove

03 Neither approve nor disapprove

04 Approve

05 Strongly approve

[as1] 您对政府处理此事件的表现做何整体评价？

01 强烈反对

02 反对

03 既不支持也不反对

04 支持

05 强烈支持

[aso] Please explain in detail your answer to the question above.

[aso] 请解释您做出上述回答的原因。

[Remainder of survey included in replication files.]

		Explicit threat	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
		Mobilization	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
		Biding time	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
Cost of war	Nationalist history									
0	0	724	58	238	12	228	21	84	8	
0	1	761	62	207	27	217	22	92	10	
1	0	83	0	14	0	16	0	4	0	
1	1	68	0	19	0	14	0	3	0	

Table D.1: Observed frequencies of treatment assignment for Hypothetical experiment.

Hypothetical scenarios have several advantages, such as greater conceptual closeness to theory. However, hypothetical designs may have weaker external validity if the scenario is overly abstract or far from the lived experience of the respondent. For example, we find that about 51 percent of respondents were thinking of particular countries as the hypothetical nation China had a territorial dispute with, and among those who were thinking of a country, they were mainly thinking of Japan (30%), the Philippines (7%) or Vietnam (5%).

Table D.2: Distribution of Respondents' Country Choices

	Percent
None	0.485
Afghanistan	0.000
Cambodia	0.000
Germany	0.000
India	0.036
Indonesia	0.001
Japan	0.301
Laos	0.001
Malaysia	0.001
Mongolia	0.001
Myanmar	0.003
Nepal	0.001
North Korea	0.013
Pakistan	0.001
Philippines	0.072
Russia	0.016
South Korea	0.007
Taiwan	0.004
Thailand	0.001
UK	0.001
US	0.006
Vietnam	0.051

E Selective-History Design

Treatments in the selective history experiment were assigned in the following manner:

- At the start of the survey, our software randomly generated 8 independent values between 0 and 99 (inclusive) for each respondent [rand1-rand8].
- Respondents receiving $\text{rand1} < 20$ did not receive any of our primary treatments (Nationalist History, Provocation, Vague Threat, Vague Threat with Defiance).
- To be assigned the Nationalist History treatment, respondents must have drawn rand1 greater than or equal to 20 and rand2 less than 20. (That is, of those who received any primary treatment, 20% were independently assigned to this treatment.)
- To be assigned the Provocation treatment, respondents must have drawn rand1 greater than or equal to 20 and rand3 less than 30. (That is, of those who received any primary treatment, 30% were independently assigned to this treatment.)
- To be assigned the Vague Threat treatment, respondents must have drawn rand1 greater than or equal to 20, rand4 less than 60, and rand5 less than 50. To be assigned the Vague Threat with Defiance treatment, respondents must have drawn rand1 greater than or equal to 20, rand4 less than 60, and rand5 greater than or equal to 50. (That is, of those who received any primary treatment, 60% were independently assigned to receive a Vague Threat treatment, 50% of whom also received the Defiance treatment and 50% of whom did not receive the Defiance treatment.)
- To be assigned the Biding Time treatment respondents must have drawn rand6 less than 15 and rand8 less than 50. To be assigned the Cost of War treatment, respondents must have drawn rand6 less than 15 and rand8 greater than or equal to 50. (That is, 15% of all respondents were independently assigned to one of either the Costs of War treatment or Biding Time treatment.)
- Those that drew random numbers that do not meet any of the criteria comprise the nonparametric control group.

We present the realized frequencies of respondents for the main treatment combinations in Table [E.1](#).

Consent

This survey is about your views of foreign affairs and domestic issues. We will ask you some questions about these topics. This survey is part of an academic research project.

此次问卷调查旨在了解您对国际和国内事务的看法。我们会问您一些关于这方面的问题。本调查是一项学术研究课题的一部分。调查结果将只用于学术目的。

The survey should take approximately 15 minutes. As specified in your invitation to this survey, you will receive an incentive if you qualify for and fully complete this survey. Participation in this study is completely voluntary. You are free to decline to participate or to end participation at any time for any reason.

完成本次调查大约需要 15 分钟。如果您具有参加本次调查的资格并且完成了本此调查的全部问题，您会收到给您的邀请中所指定的数额的奖励。参加此次调查完全基于自愿。您可以拒绝参加本调查，或者在任何时候以任何方式停止回答问卷。

Your responses will be kept confidential. We will not ask for your name, email address, or other personal identification, and we will not share any of your personal information with others. If you have any questions about this study, please contact the investigators at: adk423@gmail.com

您个人的回答将会被保密。我们不会询问您的姓名、邮箱，或其他个人身份信息，我们也不会将您的个人信息分享给他人。如果您对本研究有任何问题，请联系：
adk423@gmail.com。

- I have read the above information and agree to participate in this study.
- I do not agree to participate.

我已经阅读了以上信息并同意参与此项调查
我不同意参加此项调查

[Pre-scenario questions]

We would first like your opinion on China's international affairs.

我们希望首先了解您对于中国国际事务的看法。

[as0] Regarding the security situation in China's surrounding waters, what is your overall evaluation of the government's performance?

[randomize order so that it either goes from 1 to 5, or from 5 to 1. The display of all ordinal answers should be randomized.]

- 01 Strongly disapprove
- 02 Disapprove
- 03 Neither approve nor disapprove
- 04 Approve
- 05 Strongly approve

[as0] 关于中国周边海域安全形势，您对政府的表现做何整体评价？

- 01 强烈反对
- 02 反对
- 03 既不支持也不反对
- 04 支持
- 05 强烈支持

[ra0] Regarding the security situation in China's surrounding waters, what is the maximum probability of war with the US that you think China should risk in order to defend its maritime interests (in percentage)?

[Options range from 0% to 100%.]

[ra0] 关于中国周边海域安全形势，为了保护中国的海上利益，您认为中国应该承担的与美国发生战争的风险是多大（百分数）？

[na1] How important is it to defend the national honor even if it jeopardizes the stability of China's international environment?

[scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being not important at all, and 10 being very important]

[na1] 您认为捍卫国家荣誉的重要性有多大，即使这可能不利于中国获得稳定的国际环境？（0表示完全不重要，10表示极为重要）

[na2] In general, does China rely on military strength too much, too little or about the right amount to achieve its foreign policy goals?¹

- 01 Too much
- 02 Too little
- 03 About right
- 08 Don't know

¹ From Public Opinion Survey of the Sino-U.S. Security Perceptions (2012), Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University, question B3.

09 Refuse to answer

[na2] 一般来看，您认为中国在实现外交目标方面过多地依赖军事力量、较少地依赖军事力量，还是不多不少地依赖军事力量？

- 01 过多依赖
- 02 较少依赖
- 03 不多不少
- 08 不知道
- 09 拒绝回答

[na3] How would you describe your political views?²

- 01 very conservative
- 02 somewhat conservative
- 03 moderate
- 04 somewhat liberal
- 05 liberal
- 08 don't know
- 09 refuse to answer

[na3] 总的来说，您认为您的政治观点是非常保守的、比较保守的、温和的、比较开放的，还是非常开放的？

- 01 非常保守的
- 02 比较保守的
- 03 温和的
- 04 比较开放的
- 05 非常开放的
- 08 不知道
- 09 拒绝回答

[Scenario]

We will now remind you about some recent events. We will then ask you about your views of foreign affairs and domestic issues. We are grateful for you sharing your opinion. **Please read the following carefully.**

现在我们将回顾一些近期发生的事件，之后我们将询问您对于国际和国内事务的一些看法。我们感谢您分享您的观点。请您仔细阅读以下材料：

China and the U.S. do not agree about the appropriate rules for air transit in China's surrounding waters. China's position is that foreign military aircraft should identify themselves and follow

² This is from the Public Opinion Survey of the Sino-U.S. Security Perceptions (2012), Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University, question C6.

instructions. The U.S. has not agreed with this position.

中美两国对于中国周边海域空中交通的合适规定持不同观点。中国的立场是外国军用飞机应该向中方通报并遵照中方指示。美国不同意这种立场。

[History]

The present dispute between the United States and China reflects a long history of China's confrontations with foreign powers. As General Secretary Jiang Zemin wrote, "In more than 100 years after the Opium War, Chinese people were subjected to bullying and humiliation under foreign powers."³ In 1949, Chairman Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the new China, saying: "The Chinese people have stood up!"

中美两国现有的争端反映了中国与外国势力之间的长期对抗。正如江泽民总书记写道：“鸦片战争以后的一百多年中，中国人民曾备受列强欺凌。” 1949年，毛泽东主席宣布新中国成立并宣告“中国人民从此站起来了！”

[Provocation]

The United States frequently sends military reconnaissance patrols dangerously close to China's territorial airspace and waters. In 2001, a US military reconnaissance plane made a sudden turn and collided with a Chinese fighter jet, killing Chinese pilot Wang Wei.

美国频繁派出侦察机在中国领空和领海附近进行危险的巡逻。2001年，一架美军侦察机突然转向，与中国战斗机相撞，造成中方飞行员王伟死亡。

[ADIZ]

On November 23, 2013 China announced an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea. China announced that if any foreign aircraft fails to identify itself to Chinese authorities or refuses to follow instructions, Chinese armed forces will take defensive emergency measures.

中国于2013年11月23日宣布在东海设立防空识别区。中方宣布任何在区域内航行的不配合识别或拒不服从指令的外国航空器，中国武装力量将采取防御性紧急处置措施。

[ADIZ and Provocative Defiance]

On November 23, 2013 China announced an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea. China announced that if any foreign aircraft fails to identify itself to Chinese authorities or refuses to follow instructions, Chinese armed forces will take defensive emergency measures.

³ Wang 2012, p. 98.

The US has refused to comply with China's ADIZ. Two American B-52 long-range bombers entered China's newly established ADIZ on November 25, flying in the area of the disputed East China Sea islands without informing Beijing beforehand. A Pentagon spokesman said: "We have continued to follow our normal procedures, which include not filing flight plans, not radioing ahead and not registering our frequencies."

中国于 2013 年 11 月 23 日宣布在东海设立防空识别区。中方宣布任何在区域内航行的不配合识别或拒不服从指令的外国航空器，中国武装力量将采取防御性紧急处置措施。

美国拒绝遵从中国东海防空识别区的规定。2013 年 11 月 25 日，两架美军 B-52 轰炸机进入中国刚刚划设的东海防空识别区，在未事先通告中方的情况下在中国东海争议岛屿领空飞行。美国国防部发言人表示：“我们继续遵循我方正常程序，包括不提交飞行计划，不事先借助无线电通信，不登记我方的频率。”

[Elite Cue – Framing]

Chinese officials have explained that fighting a war in China's surrounding waters would be a grave mistake. According to General Liu Yuan, Political Commissar of the PLA's General Logistics Department, the United States is "afraid of us catching up and will use all means to check China's development, but we absolutely must not take their bait."⁴

中国官员解释称在中国周边海域开战将铸成大错。中国人民解放军总后勤部政委刘源上将表示：美国“就怕我们赶上来，千方百计要遏制中国发展，而我们千万不能上当。”

[Elite Cue – Cost of War]

Chinese officials have explained that fighting a war in China's surrounding waters would be too costly. According to General Liu Yuan, Political Commissar of the PLA's General Logistics Department: "Since we have enjoyed peace for quite a long time, many young people do not know what a war is like, it is actually very cruel and costly. If there is any alternative way to solve the problem, there is no need to resort to the means of extreme violence for a solution."⁵

中国官员解释称在中国周边海域开战的代价太大。中国人民解放军总后勤部政委刘源上将表示：“因为和平时间很长了，这么小的孩子不知道打仗是什么样，其实是很残酷的，代价很大的。可以用别的方式解决的情况下，没有必要用极端的暴力手段来解决。”

⁴ *Global Times*, February 4, 2013 (Chinese), http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2013-02/3614115.html

⁵ "Under Xi, China seeks to cool row with Japan over islands," March 16, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/16/us-china-japan-military-idUSBRE92F0EH20130316>; *Global Times*, January 16, 2013, <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2013-01/3494346.html>; English version: <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/756065.shtml>; <https://southseaconversations.wordpress.com/2013/02/18/radar-incident-obscurers-beijings-conciliatory-turn-toward-japan/>

[Ending]

To this day, the U.S. continues to fly military planes through China's surrounding waters without identifying themselves or following instructions. China has not used force to stop this.

至今，美国继续在没有进行身份识别的情况下派出飞机飞越中国周边海域。中国并未使用武力进行阻止。

[Post-scenario questions]

Reflecting on these recent developments, we would like to ask your opinion about China's international affairs.

在以上的背景下，我们希望了解您对于中国国际事务的看法。

[as1] Regarding the security situation in China's surrounding waters, what is your overall evaluation of the government's performance?

[randomize order so that it either goes from 1 to 5, or from 5 to 1. The display of all ordinal answers should be randomized.]

- 01 Strongly disapprove
- 02 Disapprove
- 03 Neither approve nor disapprove
- 04 Approve
- 05 Strongly approve

[as1] 关于中国周边海域安全形势，您对政府的表现做何整体评价？

- 01 强烈反对
- 02 反对
- 03 既不支持也不反对
- 04 支持
- 05 强烈支持

[aso] Please explain in detail your answer to the question above.

[aso] 请解释您做出上述回答的原因。

[Remainder of survey included in replication files.]

			Nationalist history	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
			Provocation	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
			Vague threat	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
Vague threat w/defiance	Biding time	Cost of war									
0	0	0		1716	541	300	221	316	228	133	87
0	0	1		137	41	30	19	35	23	12	7
0	1	0		167	49	31	16	30	21	14	5
0	1	1		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0		0	547	0	213	0	224	0	100
1	0	1		0	40	0	24	0	22	0	9
1	1	0		0	44	0	18	0	20	0	5
1	1	1		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table E.1: Observed frequencies of treatment assignment for Selective history experiment.